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1.  Introduction  
Stock prices are more informative when the information they contain has less social value. We show 
that there is a fundamental tension between the informativeness of stock prices and the effectiveness of 
corporate  governance,  which  limits the  disciplining  role  of  stock  prices.  Speculators  with limited 
resources cannot become privately informed about every firm; they choose to become informed about 
firms where the information will not affect corporate decisions.  We study these issues in the context 
of CEO turnover.  Monitoring and possibly removing the CEO is the most important function of a 
board  of  directors  of  a  corporation.  Boards  of  directors  rely  on  stock  prices  as  one  source  of 
information  for  monitoring  CEO  performance.  But,  we  show  that  speculators  prefer  to  become 
informed about firms with poor corporate governance rather than about well-run companies, ceteris 
paribus.  Paradoxically, the stock prices that are most informative are that way precisely because the 
information will not be acted upon, and therefore has no social value. 
In order to effectively monitor the CEO, the board of directors needs accurate information to judge 
whether or not the CEO is performing.  If the CEO is not performing, then the board needs to remove 
the CEO, which is costly to do. We show that the informativeness of the stock price is lower to the 
extent that the board will react to the information in the stock price.  If the board of directors reacts to 
the  stock  price  promptly  and  effectively,  their  action  destroys  the  value  of  the  informed  trader‘s 
private information and discourages him from producing information in the first place. Firms with 
more  heavily  entrenched  managements  have  poorer  corporate  governance,  but  relatively  more 
informative stock prices.  But, this information plays little disciplining role. 
The intuition for our main result is this.  A speculator thinking of producing information about a firm, 
can profitably trade on the information if he produces a private signal at a cost about the quality of the 
CEO, because that is information about future cash flows. Suppose he finds that the CEO is of low 
quality; he sells the stock (possibly he short sells), causing the stock price to go down because the 
market maker who sets the price knows there may be informed trades. The board of directors observes 
that the stock price goes down, and infers that the current CEO is a bad type and replaces him with a 
new CEO.  In this case, the stock price increases, rather than declining in favor of the informed trader, 
because the market maker anticipates how the board will respond. The informed trader loses money 
because firm value does not go down as he had expected. Anticipating that the board will act in this 
way, the informed trader chooses not to produce information about this firm. But, if the informed 
trader does not trade on privately produced information, it is not reflected in the price and the board 
may not know whether to replace the CEO.  In other words, although the board‘s efforts depend on the 
informed trader‘s information production, the informed trader‘s effort to collect information depends 
on the board not using the information.  We first present a simple model to illustrate this intuition and 2 
 
then focus on the tests of this prediction.  
The bulk of the paper is empirical analysis.  Our empirical analysis consists of both reduced-form and 
structural  estimation  of  the  theoretical  predictions  of  the  model.  In  particular,  the  simultaneous-
equation estimation aims to capture the interaction between the decisions of the informed traders and 
the decisions of the boards of directors.  The analysis proceeds in three steps. Reduced-form tests 
impose the least structure, examining the effect of CEO entrenchment on informed trading and CEO 
turnover by putting the endogeneity problem aside. We find that informed trading is increasing in 
CEO entrenchment and CEO turnover is decreasing on CEO entrenchment. The partial-information 
and full-information structural tests impose the endogeneity of informed trading and CEO turnover.  
Again, the empirical results confirm our model predictions. That is, we find that informed trading is 
decreasing  in  the  board‘s  monitoring  effort;  in  contrast,  the  board‘s  optimal  monitoring  effort  is 
increasing in informed trading.  
Our paper is related to a number of literatures. There is a theoretical literature that studies the impact 
of informative stock prices on corporate decisions. In this literature, information in stock prices has 
social value because it affects corporate decisions. This is called the ―feedback‖ effect.  Examples 
include Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Leland (1992), Holmström and Tirole (1993), Khanna, Slezak, 
and Bradley (1994), Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), and Dow and Rahi 
(2003).  The theoretical part of our paper is most closely related to Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel 
(2007), who independently find a feedback effect of stock prices on firm decisions. As in our model, 
informed traders will not produce information if, based on that information, firms – in their case -- 
cancel  investment  projects.  They  argue  that  overinvestment  is  sometimes  necessary  to  induce 
speculators to produce information. Our paper differs in that we focus on the effect of the underlying 
corporate  governance  structure  on  equilibrium  price  informativeness  and  the  likelihood  of  CEO 
turnover. By focusing on CEO replacement rather than investment, we produce a structural model that 
can be empirically tested with the CEO turnover data. 
 
There is also a related empirical literature on the feedback effect of stock prices, though it is not 
always thought of as the board or the CEO learning from stock prices.  Most closely related to our 
work is that of Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) who study this feedback effect empirically, showing 
that measures of informed trading have a positive effect on corporate investment. Our paper is very 
different because we estimate the simultaneous system jointly determining the informativeness of 
stock prices and the corporate decision, in our case the CEO replacement.  Other, but more distantly 
related,  examples  include  Baker,  Stein,  and  Wurgler  (2003),  Luo  (2005)  and  Bakke  and  Whited 
(2008), among others.  3 
 
Finally, there is a large literature on CEO turnover.  Examples include Kaplan and Minton (2006) and 
Jenter and Kanaan (2006) who show that firm performance, as measured by stock returns, plays a very 
important role in affecting CEO turnovers.  Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that the relation 
between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance, as measured by stock returns, 
has not changed significantly over the period 1971 – 1994, despite substantial changes in governance 
mechanisms.  These findings confirm the role of the stock market.  If firms rely on market information 
to make replacement decisions, then how much information is contained in the stock price is an 
important  issue.  Relative  to  this  literature,  our  contribution  is  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  the 
informativeness  of  the stock  price. To  our  knowledge,  we  are  the first to  analyze  the interaction 
between the informativeness of the stock price and the CEO replacement decision, by treating the two 
variables as endogenous in a simultaneous-equations model.  
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  first  describe  the  model  setup  and  the  basic 
assumptions. We characterize the board of director‘s optimal disciplining policy of the firm‘s CEO, 
based on inference from the stock price. The stock price is informative because of private information 
impounded  in  the  price  via  private  costly  information  production.  So,  we  also  characterize  the 
informed trader‘s optimal information effort. We solve the two optimization problems independently, 
finding the best response function of the board by taking the informed trader‘s action as exogenously 
given, and vice versa.  Afterwards, we solve for the simultaneous decisions in a Nash Equilibrium.  In 
Section 3 we derive empirical implications, put forward testable hypotheses, and explain the empirical 
strategy.  In Section 4 we first present the data sets that we use, and summarize them.  The subsequent 
subsections present the empirical results, in three steps. We first test straightforward reduced-form 
models. While these do not take advantage of the simultaneity of the decisions, they provide a first test 
that is free of the endogeneity problem. Then we test structural models of the simultaneous equations 
for the two endogenous variables. We look at two methods for testing the simultaneous system.  The 
first is a partial information method, and the second is a full-information Generalized Least Squares 
approach. In Section 5 we explore another application of the model predictions, with regard to passage 
of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  (SOX),  which  sought  to  improve  corporate  governance.   We 
examine whether the informativeness of stock prices and CEO turnover are negatively related, and 
how this relationship changes in response to the passage of SOX.  As a by-product, the analysis 
provides  evidence  on  whether  SOX  has  been  effective  in  meeting  its  stated  goals  of  reducing 





2. The Model 
In this section we present a simple model of the interaction between private information production, 
trading, stock price informativeness, and corporate governance, focusing on the decision of the board 
of directors to replace the CEO. 
2.1 Model Set-up and Results 
We consider a publicly-traded firm that operates in a risk-neutral economy where the interest rate is 
normalized to zero.  There are two periods and three dates, date 0, 1, and 2.  Agents in the economy 
include a CEO hired to run the firm (and who is possibly replaced with another CEO later), a board of 
directors which monitors the CEO, an informed trader who produces private information about the 
firm‘s earnings and trades on the information, a market maker who sets the price in the stock market, 
and liquidity traders.  
The firm‘s investment project requires inputs of both human and physical capital. The return to the 
investment depends on the quality of the human capital, in particular, the CEO.  If a ―good‖ CEO is 
hired, the investment generates a high return, which we normalize to 1.  If a ―bad‖ CEO is hired, the 
investment generates a low return, which we normalize to zero. There is uncertainty about the CEO‘s 
quality. At date 0, when a CEO is hired, it is only known that with probability m he is a good CEO; 
with probability 1-m he is a bad CEO.  (CEOs do not know their type, so there is no signaling or 
screening in the model.) The board has a chance to replace the CEO at date 1. With the elapse of time 
the board may get some information about the quality of the new CEO, and come to learn what type of 
CEO is needed. Consequently, we assume that unconditionally any new CEO hired at date 1 is better 
than the old CEO. That is, the new CEO has quality r>m, so he is a good CEO with probability r and a 
bad CEO with probability 1-r. We make the assumption that r>m just for simplifying exposition. So 
long as the firm has a chance to find a new CEO at the interim date who has quality better than m, our 
results  hold.  What  matters  is  that  the  informed  trader‘s  information  is  less  valuable  when  the 
incumbent CEO is replaced, even if that only occurs with a small probability.  
The  firm‘s  stock  is  traded  in  the  secondary  stock  market.  This  provides  an  opportunity  for  the 
informed trader to make a profit on his private information. The prices of shares at the three dates are 
p0, p1, p2. At date 2, p2 is just the final realized cash flow. The key variable is the interim stock price at 
date 1, p1.  The interim price p1 not only contains the informed trader‘s private information about the 
quality of the incumbent manager; it also incorporates the market‘s expectation about the board‘s 
reaction to this information with respect to managerial replacement. 5 
 
The information about the incumbent CEO only comes from the informed trader.
1 At date 1, the 
informed trader has a chance to learn the quality of the incumbent CEO at a cost. How accurate the 
information is depends on the cost incur red. We assume that the informed trader learns whether the 
incumbent CEO is good or bad with probability   at a cost A
2/2, with A>0. The informed trader 
needs  to  decide  how  much  information  he  produces;  in  other  words,    is  the  informed  trader‘s 
decision variable.  
 
The informed trader‘s information becomes embedded in the stock price through his trading. We 
borrow the market structure of Kyle (1985) to determine the stock price in equilibrium. Specifically, 
we assume that the informed trader and the liquidity traders submit orders to the market maker who 
sets the share price conditional on the order flow that he observes. The liquidity traders submit either a 
buy order or a sell order of size   with equal probability. The informed trader submits an order 
contingent on the information he has received. If he receives good news (that the incumbent CEO is 
―good‖), he submits a buy order; if he receives bad news, he submits a sell order; he does not trade if 
he receives no news. In order to hide his order behind those from the liquidity traders, the informed 
trader always submits an order of size  whenever he trades. The market maker can only observe the 
aggregate order flow; he cannot tell the identity of the agent submitting the order. Upon receiving the 
orders, the market maker sets the price equal to the expected value of the firm contingent on two 
things: first, the information he infers from the order flow; second,  his conjecture of the  board‘s 
reaction to the stock price, given the firm‘s governance regime (which is common knowledge).  
 
On the equilibrium path, the market maker will observe one of five possible order flows: (1) two buy 
orders; (2) two sell orders; (3) one buy order and one sell order; (4) one buy order; and (5) one sell 
order.  If he observes two buy orders, he knows that the informed trader has submitted a buy order and 
he infers that the incumbent CEO is a good one. Since there is no reason to replace a good CEO, the 
market maker sets the stock price equal to one. If the market maker receives two sell orders, he knows 
that the informed trader has submitted a sell order and infers that the incumbent CEO is bad. In all 
other cases, the aggregate order does not reveal the informed trader‘s information, and the market 
maker only knows that the incumbent is of quality m.  
 
When the market reveals that the incumbent CEO is not a good manager, it is in the board of directors‘ 
interest to replace him because a new CEO generates a high return with a higher probability. But, a 
replacement is costly and uncertain. As briefly reviewed below, boards are complicated and they 
                                                           
1 The board of directors or block shareholders could also produce information, but for simplicity we do not 
model these sources. We assume that the stock market provides external information that is useful, in addition to 
internal information, for making CEO replacement decisions.  6 
 
cannot  always  agree.  We  assume  that  in  order  to  make  a  successful  replacement  with 
probabilitythe board has to incur a cost E
2/2. The parameter will be chosen by the board given 
that the board faces a CEO who is entrenched to some extent. The parameter E reflects how difficult it 
is to remove a manager, and we interpret it as a measure of the extent of managerial entrenchment. 
The choice of , and hence incurrence of the cost, occurs before the market reveals information about 
the  incumbent  manager.
2  We  treat  the replacement cost as a cost privately borne by the board 
members, for example, as the stigma of being on the board of a company that has not removed a bad 
CEO.
3  If the cost were to be an explicit cost to the firm, then it would have to be reflected in the share 
prices, which could be modeled, but for sim plicity we have not done this.  This is discussed further 
below. 
 
When the market maker infers from the order flow that the incumbent CEO is not a good type, he 
rationally anticipates that the board will replace the CEO with probability   and he incorporates this 
expectation into the stock price he sets. The market maker sets the stock price equal to  r if he 
receives two sell orders and the aggregate order reveals that the CEO is bad. He sets the price equal to 
m(1-)+r=m+(r-m) if he receives one buy order, or one sell order, or one buy order plus one sell 
order.  In all these three cases, the aggregate order flow does not reveal the manager‘s type.  
 
The following table shows the possible order flows, the expected stock prices, and the board‘s reaction 
at date 1. 
   
                                                           
2 By assuming that the board of directors makes the monitoring effort before observing the stock price, we make 
the analysis simple because otherwise the board‘s decision would be contingent on the stock price.  However, the 
main results are still valid even in the case that the board makes the decision after observing the stock price.  
3 Directors seem concerned about their reputations, as a strong reputation aids in getting more board seats.  Fich 
(2005) finds that the cumulative abnormal return is significantly greater upon announcement of the addition of a 
director who is CEO of another firm with a higher industry-adjusted ROA.  Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that 
directors who sit on the boards of firms that are the subject of shareholder class-action lawsuits alleging financial 
fraud see a significant drop in the number of seats they hold.  Also, see Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990). 7 
 



















Good  2 Buys  m/2  1  Retain  1 
Good  1 Buy and 1 Sell  m/2  m+(r-m)  Replace with prob   1-(1-r) 
Bad  2 Sells  (1-m)/2  r  Replace with prob   r 
Bad  1buy and 1 sell  (1-m)/2  m+(r-m)  Replace with prob   r 
None  1 buy or 1 sell  1-  m+(r-m)  Replace with prob   m+(r-m) 
 
Now we turn to calculating how much profit the informed trader expects to make in each case.  If the 
interim stock price is not equal to 1, the board of directors knows that ―the market‖ did not identify the 
incumbent CEO as ―good‖ and tries to replace the CEO. If the CEO is replaced, there is no uncertainty 
about the return on the investment; it is r. In this case the informed trader‘s information is no longer 
useful. This is the main force in our model that creates the tension between information production, so 
that prices are informative, and corporate governance. On the one hand, the CEO replacement decision 
depends on the information the informed trader injects into the stock price via trading; on the other 
hand, CEO replacement changes the future cash flow and eliminates the value of the informed trader‘s 
private information. The informed trader can profit from his private information only if the stock price 
does not reveal his information and if the CEO is not replaced. If good information is not revealed, his 
profit is (1-m)(1-), which is equal to the difference between the informed trader‘s expected firm 
value and the interim stock price (see the second row in the table); this happens with probability m/2. 
If bad news is not revealed, then the speculator‘s profit is m(1-) (see the fourth row in the table); this 
happens with probability (1-m)/2. In equilibrium, the informed trader takes the board‘s choice of as 
given and chooses how much information to collect. His decision variable is , the effort he makes to 
collect information, which is also the probability that he receives information (good or bad).  
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The objective function is quadratic and the optimal solution is: 








The  solution  says  that  the  informed  trader‘s  effort  decreases  with  the  probability  that  the  board 
replaces the incumbent manager. In case a replacement happens, the firm‘s cash flow depends on the 
new CEO‘s quality, and the informed trader‘s information about the old CEO is no longer useful. In 
other  words,  monitoring  by  the  board  impairs  the  profitability  of  information  production  by  the 
informed trader. In equilibrium, the informed trader‘s choice also has an impact on the board‘s choice 
of replacement probability. Before we solve these two choices jointly, we look at the board‘s decision, 
taking the informed trader‘s effort choice as exogenously given.  
The board wants to replace the CEO when the market reveals that he is the bad type. When a bad CEO 
is replaced, the payoff of replacement is r-0; the probability of a bad CEO being revealed is (1-m)/2. 
When a CEO of type m is replaced, the payoff to replacement is r-m, and the probability of the market 
price being uninformative is 2 / 1   . Since replacement only succeeds with probability , the board‘s 
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The board is not perfect in its ability to discipline the CEO.  As we discuss below, the board itself 
might well be conflicted. Here this is modeled by the exogenous parameter E, which characterizes the 
extent of the CEO‘s entrenchment.  The optimal solution shows that the board is less able to discipline 
the CEO, to the extent that the CEO is entrenched, i.e., E is higher.  We can also see from the board‘s 
optimal decision, that the board‘s monitoring choice increases with the informativeness of the stock 
price. When the informed trader makes a greater effort to acquire information, it is more likely for the 
market to reveal a CEO who is not good and thus needs to be replaced. Therefore the board can 
replace the incumbent CEO more accurately and the payoff to the board‘s effort is larger. 
 




Proposition 1:  Taking the board’s monitoring effort,  as given, the informed trader’s optimal 
information production effort is ) 1 (      , which is decreasing in . Taking the informed trader’s 
information  production  effort,    as  given,  and  the  board’s  optimal  monitoring  effort  is  
,
2
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E
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  which is increasing in .     
 
The proposition makes the point that the informativeness of share prices, which depends on  is 
limited  by  the  extent  to  which  the  price  is  used  to  affect  the  subject  of  the  informed  trader‘s 
speculation,  namely,  the  CEO.    Although  the  board  wants  to  act  on  more  accurate  information 
extracted from the stock price, to the extent that the board is effective in replacing the CEO, the 
informed trader has a greater disincentive to collect information. The tension caused by the interaction 
between the board of directors and the informed trader determines how informative the stock price is 
and how likely a manager is to be replaced. 
 
Next we solve for the equilibrium choice of  and  jointly in a Nash Equilibrium. From equations (1) 
and (2) we derive the optimal solutions for  and as follows: 
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The  solution  for  shows  that  the  board‘s  optimal  effort  choice  is  decreasing  in  the  degree  of 
entrenchment, E.  How the informed trader‘s information choice  is affected by entrenchment is less 
clear. Intuitively, entrenchment only affects the informed trader‘s choice of  through the board‘s 
effort choice .  Since  is decreasing in , we conjecture that  is increasing in entrenchment, E. 
Taking the derivative of  with respect to E, we get: 
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which confirms the conjecture. 
 
Proposition 2:  When the board’s monitoring effort choice,  and the informed trader’s optimal 
information choice,  are jointly endogenized in equilibrium, we have 
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 ,  with  decreasing in E and  increasing in E. 10 
 
Proposition 2 expresses the outcome in terms of the degree of entrenchment, E.  From the informed 
trader‘s  point  of  view,  a  more  entrenched  CEO  offers  a  higher  expected  return  on  information 
production because this CEO is not likely to be ousted by the board in case there is bad news in the 
stock price.  From the point of view of the board of directors, it is increasingly costly to discipline a 
CEO who is entrenched.  And, ironically, entrenched CEOs are associated with more informative 
stock prices.  
 
2.2 Discussion of the Model 
 
The model assigns a central role to the board of directors, which itself is endogenously chosen (e.g., 
see Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, 2003 and Adams and Ferreira 2007).  The board members may be 
chosen by the CEO and there may be few independent directors.  Further, the CEO may be chairman 
of the board.  Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that the CEO essentially controls the board. 
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) argue that independent directors are more capable of resisting this control. 
They find, for example, that firms with more inside directors, entrenched CEOs, and CEOs who are 
also chairman of the board, are less likely to use equity-based compensation.  There is a very large 
literature  on  these  issues.  We  have  modeled  the  possibly  conflicted  board  by  making  the  board 
imperfect.  It cannot discipline perfectly even when it has perfect information that the CEO is bad.  It 
can only fire the CEO with probability and that depends on the extent of entrenchment, E, and on 
the informativeness of the stock market.  In our empirical work we will take into account proxies of E 
from both the CEO‘s perspective and the board‘s perspective.  
 
In order to effectively monitor the CEO, the board needs accurate information to judge whether or not 
the CEO is performing; second, the board needs the power to discipline the CEO. Unfortunately, our 
model shows that information and control do not go hand in hand. When the board reacts to market 
information promptly and effectively, it is difficult for informed traders to profit from their private 
information, giving them no incentive to collect information in the first place. CEO entrenchment is 
the underlying force that determines informativeness of the stock price and effectiveness of board 
monitoring in equilibrium. In the face of entrenchment, the market cannot be a disciplining force 
because it is not profitable to speculate. 
 
Large shareholders are also often thought of as monitors of management because they have a greater 
incentive to monitor, compared to small dispersed shareholders (e.g., see Maug, 1998). Could our 
model of the board of directors be equally thought of disciplining by a large blockholder? A large 
blockholder can discipline the CEO only by influencing the board of directors, which has the sole 
power to fire the CEO. The entrenchment cost, E, subsumes the ownership structure, among other 11 
 
things. More generally, concentrated blocks of stocks are often subject to agency problems themselves 
because they are effectively controlled by delegated portfolio managers, who may not have incentives 
to monitor management.  In our empirical work, we will take account of block share holdings but, as 
we discuss further below, the predicted sign of the effect is unclear. 
 
3.  Empirical Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section we set forth the empirical hypotheses following from the model and then we specify the 
structural empirical models; finally we explain the empirical strategy for testing.  
 
The basic idea of the model is straightforward: conditional on control variables, a measure of informed 
trading should be positively related to proxies for the degree of  managerial entrenchment. This is 
because  our  theoretical  model  shows  that  there  is  a  tension  between  information  production  and 
monitoring by the board of directors.  Since board disciplining of CEOs is costlier when the CEO is 
more entrenched, the CEO is less likely to be forced out.  In that case, private information production 
is more profitable—precisely when it has no social value. Private information production is reduced, 
resulting in less informative stock prices, when the CEO is less entrenched.  Due to this tension, we 
have an equilibrium model in which the informed trader‘s effort of information production and the 
board‘s monitoring effort are jointly determined. On the one hand, board monitoring is more effective 
when  the  market  provides  more  accurate  information,  so  we  should  observe  board  monitoring 
increases in informed trading. On the other hand, the informed trader profits are reduced by board 
monitoring so we should observe that informed trading decreases to the extent that board monitoring is 




We develop our empirical analysis progressively in two steps: first, we examine reduced-form tests 
and second, we examine structural simultaneous-equations tests. We first put the endogeneity issue 
aside and estimate reduced-formed models. The hypothesis corresponding to Proposition 2 can be 
stated as: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The informed trader’s effort to collect information is increasing in the degree of the 





Reduced  form  estimation  tests  the  predictions  of  Proposition  2  without  concerns  about  the 
specification  and  estimation  issues  related  to  structural  estimation.  Although  other  papers  in  the 
literature (for example, Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001) have examined the relation between CEO 
turnover and corporate governance, our test of the impact of CEO entrenchment on informed trading is 
new. The reduced-form tests enable us to check whether our theoretical comparative statics are correct 
before we proceed to conduct more complicated structural tests of simultaneous equations.   
Because  the  board‘s  monitoring  effort  and  the  informed  trader‘s  information  effort  are  jointly 
determined in our theoretical model, they are both endogenous variables in empirical tests. We thus set 
up a structural system of simultaneous equations. Our second hypothesis corresponds to Proposition 1.  
Hypothesis 2:    The  informed  trader’s  effort  to  collect  information is decreasing in  the  board of 
directors’  monitoring  effort;  the  board  monitoring  effort  is  increasing  in  the  informed  trader’s 
information production effort. 
 
Hypothesis 1 tests the effect of CEO entrenchment on informed trading. Hypothesis 2 takes one step 
further to study the interaction of informed trading and board monitoring. The study of the effect of 
firm performance on CEO turnover (such as Kaplan and Minton 2006 and Jenter and Kanaan 2006) is 
related to one of the two simultaneous equations in our model. If CEO turnover is related to firm 
performance, it has to be related to the force that reveals that performance in the stock market. That 
force is informed trading. But this is only part of the story. We show that there is another part of the 
story: board monitoring has a feedback effect on informed trading. We use a simultaneous-equations 
model to empirically characterize the whole picture. 
 
3.2 Empirical Specification 
 
For empirical tests, we use the probability of informed trading (PIN) to measure the informed trader‘s 
information production effort and the probability of forced CEO turnover (FORCETURN) to measure 
the board‘s monitoring effort.  PIN is a measure developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O‘Hara (1996, 
1997a, b).  It is based on a structural market microstructure model.
4  Because forced CEO turnover is a 
discrete variable, that is, a CEO is either forced out of office or not, we adopt the limited -dependent-
variable approach to characterize a probabilistic relation for this binary-response variable. 
 
The  structural  system  has  two  equations:   the  PIN  equation  and  the  FORCETURN  equation.  
                                                           
4 Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O‘Hara (2002) show that stocks with a high PIN earn higher returns, to compensate 
investors for the higher risk of private information.  PIN has become widely used in the literature.   13 
 
Specifically, we formulate the structural PIN equation as follows:
5 
PIN = ʱ0 + ʱ*FORCETURN + ʱ2*Controls_PIN + ʵ1,         (6) 
where  FORCETURN  is  the  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for  forced  CEO  turnover  and  zero 
otherwise, and Controls_PIN represents a (lagged) set of control variables that have been identified as 
PIN determinants in the literature (see Section 4.1 below for details).  
 
Meanwhile, we specify the structural FORCETURN equation as follows: 
FORCETURN = β0 + β*PIN + β2*Controls_FORCETURN + β3*Entrenchment + ʵ2,       (7) 
where Controls_FORCETURN represents a (lagged) set of control variables that are known to affect 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnover in the literature, and Entrenchment is a set of variables that 
serve as proxies for CEO entrenchment, E, in the theoretic model. Because the dependent variable of 
this  model,  FORCETURN,  is  a  binary  variable  taking  on  two  values,  zero  and  one,  an  oft-used 
equivalent representation of this model specification consists of the following two equations (see, e.g., 
Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 15)):  
y* = β0 + β*PIN + β2*Controls_FORCETURN + β3*Entrenchment + ʵ2,     (8) 
FORCETURN = 1[y*>0],                                                                 (9) 
where the symbol 1[.] is an indicator function, and y* is a latent variable that is linearly related to PIN, 
Entrenchment and the control variables affecting the board‘s CEO turnover decision. 
3.3 Estimation Strategy 
 
Given the above empirical specification, our estimation strategy consists of three parts, which are 
increasingly complicated and explained below. 
 
In principle, we are only interested in the simultaneous system of equations, but as is well documented 
in the econometrics literature (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002; and Greene, 2005), there are some pitfalls 
to estimating the simultaneous-equation model, such as identification, endogeneity bias, model mis-
specification, etc. Thus, we first put aside the endogeneity issue and estimate the reduced-form of the 
simultaneous-equation model. The reduced-form estimation typically serves as the first step toward 
                                                           
5 We do not include Entrenchment proxies in the structural PIN equation because our theoretical model does not 
yield such a direct relation between PIN and Entrenchment. Instead, our model predicts that Entrenchment is 
indirectly related to PIN only through the relation between Entrenchment and forced CEO turnover.  14 
 
estimating a system of simultaneous equations. Moreover, the reduced-form estimation tests the results 
of  Proposition  2  without  concerns  about  specification  and  estimation  issues  related  to  structural 
estimation of the simultaneous-equation model. 
 
We then proceed to estimate the simultaneous-equation system. We carry out the structural estimation 
using two approaches. We start with a partial-information approach by estimating the system equation-
by-equation. That is, if we focus only on the structural PIN equation, we specify a reduced form for 
the FORCETURN equation; likewise, if we focus only on the structural FORCETURN equation, we 
specify a reduced form for the PIN equation. The essence of this partial-information approach is the 
two-stage-estimation  method,  which  is  known  to  produce  consistent,  but  generally  inefficient, 
estimates for parameters of a structural equation. To improve the efficiency of this partial-information 
approach, we use the one-step Maximum-Likelihood-Estimation (MLE) method.
6 In the Appendix, we 
derive the likelihood functions for the MLE method. Finally, we use a full -information approach to 
estimate the simultaneous-equation system. Because the likelihood for the full-information approach is 
much more difficult to derive and the MLE is much more cumbersome to implement, we rely on the 
Generalized-Least-Squares  (GLS)  method  proposed  by  Amemiya  (1979)  to  conduct  the  full -
information estimation. Amemiya shows that his GLS estimates are asymptotically efficient and easier 
to calculate than the MLE estimates. 
A caveat is in order. Relative to the partial-information approach, the full-information approach takes 
into account the correlation between the error terms of the two structural equations and, therefore, is 
asymptotically more efficient (Greene, 2005). However, the full -information approach is sensitive to 
model specifications. If one struct ural equation happens to be mis specified, then the parameter 
estimates of both structural equations in the system would be conta minated if we use the full -
information approach. In contrast, the partial -information approach by and large confines the mis -
specification problem to the particular structural equation where the problem arises. Therefore, to 
maintain a balance between consistency and efficiency of estimations, we estimate the simultaneous-
equation  model  with  both  the  partial -information  approach  and  the  full -information  approach. 
Moreover, because we conduct the partial-information estimation with MLE and the full-information 
estimation with GLS, respectively, such exercises provide robustness checks of our empirical analysis 




                                                           
6  We  also  estimate  the  system  of  simultaneous  equations  with  the  two-step  partial-information  estimation 
method. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 15 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
We begin this section with an introduction of the various data sources.  Then we move on to the three 
levels  of  testing:  reduced  forms,  partial-information  structural  estimation,  and  full-information 
structural estimation. 
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
4.1.1 Data 
Data are from various sources, as well as hand collected. All stock price and stock return data come 
from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices  (CRSP)  Monthly  Stock  File  and  accounting 
information  is  from  the  Compustat  Annual  File.  Executive  information  is  from  the  Execucomp 
database. Institutional and blockholding data are from the Thompson Financial Institutional Holdings 
database. Analyst coverage information is from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) 
Historical  Summary  file.  Board  composition  information  is  obtained  from  the  Board  Analytics 
Database. 
The  two  choice  variables  in  our  theoretical  model  are  the  informed  trader‘s  optimal  information 
production effort choice and the board‘s disciplining effort choice.  For empirical tests, we measure 
them by the probability of informed trading (PIN) and by the probability of forced CEO turnover 
(FORCETURN), respectively. The PIN measure is constructed on the basis of Easley et al.‘s (1996, 
1997) structural market microstructure model. We use the quarterly PIN data estimated by Stephen 
Brown of Emory University.
7 
The CEO turnover data is based on Jenter and Kanaan (2006). Their dataset covers the period from 
1993 to 2001; we hand collect  more data to extend the  period covered  through the year of 2006. 
Specifically, we identify a CEO turnover (CEOTURN) for each firm and for each year in which the 
CEO recorded in the Standard & Poor‘s Execucomp database changes. We then search the Factiva 
news database and the Lexus-Nexus news database for the exact turnover announcement date and 
classify  each  CEO  turnover  according  to  whether  the  turnover  is  forced  or  voluntary.  The 
classification of CEO turnovers into ―forced‖ or ―voluntary‖ follows Parrino (1997) and Jenter and 
Kanaan (2006).
8  The variable CEOTURN is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO changes in 
                                                           
7 The data is available at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~sbrow22/index.html.  We also used an annual PIN 
measure that we estimated; the results are similar.  Because the quarterly PIN data better matches CEO turnover 
data in timing than the annual PIN data does, we focus on the quarterly PIN data in the paper. 
8 As Jenter and Kanaan (2006, p17) explain:, ‗‗…all departures for which the press reports state that the CEO is 
fired, forced out, or retires or resigns due to policy differences or pressure, are classified as forced. All other 
departures for CEOs above and including age 60 are classified as not forced. All departures for CEOs below age 16 
 
one specific year and zero otherwise. Similarly, FORCETURN is a dummy variable that is set to one if 
the CEO turnover is forced, and to zero otherwise.  
To be consistent with the timing of the two choice variables in our model, we use the following rule to 
match PIN with FORCETURN (or, alternatively, CEOTURN). If there is no CEO turnover for a given 
year (i.e., CEOTURN=0), we calculate the average PIN over the four quarters prior to the calendar 
date corresponding to the fiscal year-end.
9 On the other hand, if there is a CEO turnover in a given 
year (i.e., CEOTURN=1), we calculate the average PIN over the four quarters prior to the CEO 
turnover date. We then match the average quarterly PIN with the CEO turnover data.  To match other 
data with the matched data of PIN and CEO turnover, we adopt the following rule. We first annualize 
the quarterly data by calculating the four-quarter average, then we match the annual or annualized data 
of year t-1 with the CEO turnover data of year t.
10  
For the empirical tests, we use four proxies for the degree of CEO entrenchment: the logarithm of the 
value of CEO tenure (LNTEN), the CEO‘s stock ownership as a ratio of a company‘s outstanding 
shares (CEOSH), a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO also serves as the chairman of the 
board of directors (DUAL), and the fraction of outside directors on the board (POD) for the firms 
covered in the Execucomp database.
11 We extract information on CEO tenure, CEO stock ownership 
and CEO-Chair duality from Execucomp, if avail able; we supplement and/or correct these data by 
hand-collecting, if necessary.  For DUAL, the dummy that is equal to one if a CEO is also the chair of 
the firm‘s board and to zero otherwise. We retrieve the board composition information from the Board 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
60 are reviewed further and classified as forced if either the article does not report the reason as death, poor 
health, or the acceptance of another position (including the chairmanship of the board), or the article reports that 
the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the retirement at least six months before the succession. Finally, the 
cases classified as forced can be reclassified as voluntary if the press reports convincingly explain the departure 
as due to previously undisclosed personal or business reasons that are unrelated to the firm‘s activities.‘‘ 
9 Using annual PIN gives substantially similar results, but when a quarterly PIN series became available we 
switched to the quarterly data.  The main reason for averaging PIN over four quarters is to try to eliminate 
potential estimation error.  However, using just quarterly PIN again gives substantially similar results. 
10 As a result, the control variables are one-period lagged relative to FORCETURN (or CEOTURN); the control 
variables  are one-period-lagged relative to PIN for the  no-turnover group (CEOTURN=0) and "semi" one -
period-lagged relative to PIN for the turnover group (CEOTUIRN=1). Following are two examples. Example 1, 
CEOTURN=1: say, turnover date is July 15, 2000 and the corresponding fiscal year-end is December 31, 2000. 
PIN is calculated as a four -quarter average over the period of Jul y 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000. Tobin's Q is 
calculated at the last fiscal year -end, i.e., Dec 31, 1999.  Example 2,  CEOTURN=0: say, fiscal year -end is 
December 31, 2000. PIN is calculated as a four-quarter average over the period of Jan 1, 2000 to December 31,  
2000. Tobin's Q is calculated at the last fiscal year -end, i.e., Dec 31, 1999.  Aside from using the four-quarter 
average, we have also used in our analysis the quarterly PIN, which avoids the timing issue as shown in Example 
1. The results are similar and are available upon request. 
11 In addition to the proxies for corporate governance and CEO entrenchment, we also looked at concentrated 
institutional  ownership,  the  G-index  developed  by  Gompers,  Ishii,  and  Metrick  (2003),  and  the  E-index 
developed  by  Bebchuk,  Cohen,  and  Ferrell  (2004). We  found  the  effect  of  these  proxies  to  be  statistically 
insignificant and thus did not include them in the paper. 17 
 
Analytics Database that covers the period from 1996 to 2006; we extend its coverage to the 1995-2006 
period by hand collecting the board composition data for the year of 1995.
12  
There are two sets of c ontrol variables, one for the structural PIN equation,  Controls_PIN, and the 
other for the structural FORCETURN equation, Controls_FORCETURN. From the existing literature, 
these control variables are known to affect either PIN or forced CEO turnovers.    Specifically, 
Controls_PIN includes  the logarithm value of market capitalization (LNME),  the return on assets 
(ROA),  the  one-year stock return (RET1YR),  the  stock beta (BETA),  the  one-year stock return 
volatility (VOL1YR), the logarithm value of share turnover (LNSHTURN), Tobin‘s Q (TOBIN), the 
logarithm value of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm (LNNUMEST), the fraction of a 
company‘s shares held by all institutional investors (INSTHOLD), the logarithm value of firm age 
(LNFMAGE), industry dummies (INDUSTRY), and year dummies (YEAR). We calculate ROA as 
the  ratio  of  operating  income  after  depreciation  (item  178)  to  total  assets (item  6).  We  calculate 
RET1YR as the cumulative monthly returns over the past twelve months. We estimate BETA from 
fitting the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to a company‘s monthly stock returns over the past 
five years. We annualize the standard deviation in daily stock returns over the past one year to obtain 
VOL1YR.  We  divide  the  total  number  of  shares  traded  (item  28)  by  the  total  number  of  shares 
outstanding (item 25) and take logs on the ratio to obtain LNSHTURN. We calculate TOBIN as the 
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals 
the book value of assets (item 6) plus the market value of common equity (item 25 times item 199) 
minus the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). If the 
number  of  analyst  information  for  a  firm  is  missing,  we  set  the  number  to  zero.    We  compute 
INSTHOLD as the ratio of the total number of shares held by all institutions to the total number of 
shares outstanding.  We calculate LNFMAGE as the logarithm value of the number of years since the 
CRSP begins its coverage of a firm. Finally, we use Fama and French‘s 49-industry definitions to 
classify firms into one of these industries. 
Similarly,  for  the  FORCETURN  equation,  Controls_FORCETURN  represents  a  set  of  control 
variables  that  are  documented  in  the  literature  to  affect  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover, 
including  LNME,  ROA,  RET1YR,  industry  returns  (INDRET),  LNSHRTURN,  TOBIN, 
LNNUMEST, logarithm value of one plus the number of blockholders (LNNUMBH), logarithm value 
of CEO age (LNCEOAGE), INSUTRY, and YEAR. For each of Fama and French‘s 49 industries, we 
sum over the one-year stock returns of all the firms of this industry with equal weights to calculate 
INDRET. We use INDRET as a benchmark that the board may use to assess CEO performance; the 
―relative  performance‖  hypothesis  in  the  literature  is  discussed  below.  A  blockholder  is  the 
                                                           
12 Because the quality of Execucomp data is not very high for the first few years of its coverage, we decided to 
focus on the period starting from 1995. We thus hand collected the board composition data for 1995 only. 18 
 
institutional  investor  that  owns  more  than  five  percent  of  a  company‘s  shares.  Besides 
Controls_FORCETURN, the FOCETURN equation also includes Entrenchment which is the above-
mentioned set of variables that serve as proxies for the CEO entrenchment, E, in the theoretical model. 
4.1.2 Summary Statistics 
At the intersections of the above datasets, our sample contains 16,726 firm-year observations and 
covers the period from 1995 to 2006. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these variables. Panel A 
summarizes the two choice variables and the four CEO entrenchment proxies. The PIN variable has a 
mean  of  0.150  and  a  median  of  0.140,  and  its  standard  error  is  0.072.
13  The CEO turnover rate 
averages at 0.099 or 9.9% with a standard error of 0.299.  About one quarter of the CEO turnovers are 
forced: FORCETURN averages at 0.024 or 2.4% over the period with a standard error of 0.153.  For 
the four CEO entrenchment proxies, CEO tenure averages at about seven years (the average LNTEN 
equal to 1.962 years) with a minimum of one year and a maximum of 61 years (the maximum LNTEN 
equal to 4.111 years); the average CEO stock ownership is 0.026 or 2.6% with a median of 0.003 and a 
maximum of 0.642; close to two-thirds of CEOs serve as board chairs of their companies; about 80% 
of the directors sitting on the boards are outsiders. Note that, for each of the first three entrenchment 
proxies (LNTEN, CEOSH, DUAL), the higher its value, the stronger is CEO entrenchment; but for the 
last entrenchment proxy (POD), the higher its value, the weaker is CEO entrenchment.  
Panel  B  of   Table  1  reports  the  correlations  for  the  two  choice  variables  and  the  four  CEO 
entrenchment proxies. The correlation panel provides a glimpse of several empirical relations that are 
supportive of our model predictions. First, the correlation coefficient between PIN and FORCETURN 
is small and is statistically insignificant, which is potentially in line with our model prediction that the 
two  choice  variables  are  endogenous  and  determined  jointly.  Second,  PIN  is  positively  and 
significantly  correlated  with  CE O  tenure  and  CEO  stock  ownership,  and  it  is  negatively  and 
significantly correlated with the fraction of outside directors. This evidence is consistent with our 
model  prediction  that  the  optimal  informed  trader‘s  effort  is  increasing  in  the  degree  of  CEO 
entrenchment. Third, FORCETURN is negatively and significantly correlated with CEO tenure, CEO 
stock ownership, and CEO-chair duality, and it is positively and significantly correlated with the 
fraction  of  outside  directors.  These  results  echo  our  model  prediction  that  the  optimal  board 
monitoring effort is decreasing in the degree of CEO entrenchment. Fourth, CEO tenure, CEO stock 
ownership, and CEO-chair duality are all positively and significantly correlated with each other, and 
both  CEO  tenure  and  CEO  stock  ownership  are  negatively  and  significantly  correlated  with  the 
fraction of outside directors. 
                                                           
13 For comparison, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O‘Hara (2002) report a median PIN of 0.185, mean PIN equal to 
0.191 and a standard deviation of 0.057 over the 1983-1998 period. 19 
 
Table 1, Panel C presents the summary statistics of the control variables, which are in line with the 
ones reported in the empirical literatures and are not elaborated here. Notably, for an average firm in 
our sample, the market capitalization is 1.62 billion US dollars (average of LNME=7.390); its ROA 
equals 0.084 or 8.4%; its beta and annualized stock return and volatility are respectively 1.061, 0.201 
or 20.1%, and 0.428 or 42.8%; its Tobin‘s Q equals 2.018; the turnover of its shares is 1.27 (average 
of LNSHTURN=0.236); it has about five equity analysts (average of LNNUMEST=1.740) and two 
block  holders  (average  of  LNNUMBH=0.927),  and  61%  of  its  shares  are  held  by  institutional 
investors;  the  firm‘s  age  and  the  firm  CEO‘s  age  are  respectively  19  years  old  (average 
LNFMAGE=2.943) and 57 years old (average LNCEOAGE=4.037). 
Table 2 shows the two choice variables PIN and FORCETURN (and CEOTURN) across fiscal years. 
The yearly summary statistics for the choice variables are generally similar to the pooled summary 
statistics. The PIN measure shows a decreasing pattern, i.e., prices are becoming less informative, 
across years, down from an average of 0.180 in 1995 to an average of 0.131 in 2006. The average 
CEO turnover rates stays around 10% per year except 2006,
14 and around 20%-25% of the CEO 
turnover is forced per year.   Also not surprisingly, the (forced) CEO turnover rates are relatively 
higher for the three  fiscal years, 2000, 2001, and 2002, because of the stock market crash and the 
ensuing economic recession during that period. 
4.2 Reduced-Form Tests 
We now proceed to formally test our key model predictions. Our model can be summarized by the two 
structural equations, equations (1) and (2), as seen in Proposition 1. Equation (1) characterizes the 
informed trader‘s optimal effort choice, taking as given the board‘s monitoring effort; and equation (2) 
determines the board‘s optimal monitoring effort, taking as given the informed trader‘s information 
production  effort.  Solving  the  two  structural  equations  jointly,  we  obtain  the  two  reduced-form 
equations, equations (3) and (4), as shown in Proposition 2. Accordingly, we conduct the empirical 
analysis in two steps: we first test Hypothesis 2 by estimating the two reduced-form equations, and 
afterwards, we test Hypothesis 1 by estimating the two structural equations. 
From the two reduced-form equations in Proposition 2, we see that the informed trader‘s optimal 
information  production  effort  level  is  increasing  in  the  degree  of  CEO  entrenchment  (the  PIN 
equation),  and  that  the  board‘s  optimal  replacement  effort  is  decreasing  in  the  degree  of  CEO 
entrenchment (the FORCETURN equation). 
4.2.1 The Reduced-Form PIN Equation 
                                                           
14 The average CEO turnover rate is significantly lower for fiscal year 2006, which is 3.3%. This is mainly due to 
the lack of CEO turnover information for this year. 20 
 
We  first  estimate  the  reduced-form  PIN  equation,  which  we  specify  as  follows  based  on  the 
specifications of the two structural equations: 
PIN = π0 + π*Entrenchment + π2*Controls + η1,         (10) 
where Entrenchment is one single proxy or, alternatively,  several proxies for CEO entrenchment, and 
Controls represents the set of control variables, as explained above, which is a union of Controls_PIN 
and Controls_FORCETURN. 
Table  3  reports  the  OLS  estimation  results  of  the  reduced-form  PIN  equation  using  different 
combinations  of  the  four  CEO  entrenchment  proxies,  with  robust  standard  errors  adjusted  for 
clustering in firms.  Consistent with earlier findings in the PIN literature (e.g., Easley et al., 2002), PIN 
is significantly and negatively related to firm size, share turnover, number of analysts covering the 
firm, aggregate institutional holding, and firm age; PIN is significantly and positively related to stock 
return  volatility,  Tobin‘s  q,  and  number  of  blockholders.  In  our  sample,  PIN  is  found  to  be  not 
significantly related to a firm‘s accounting performance or the stock‘s beta risk, and it is found to be 
negatively significantly related to CEO age only when CEO tenure is also used in the regression. 
Interestingly, a company‘s PIN is significantly negatively related to the stock performance of the 
industry but is significantly positively related to the stock performance of the firm. This evidence 
appears to suggest that the informed trader has more incentive to collect information as the stock 
return of a targeted firm increases relative to the stock return of the industry to which the firm belongs. 
The key parameters of interest in the reduced-form PIN equation are the estimated coefficients on 
Entrenchment. In Models (1)-(4) we study the four Entrenchment proxies separately in the reduced-
form PIN equation, and in Model (5) we study the four Entrenchment proxies jointly. It is clear that 
the PIN variable is generally increasing in the degree of Entrenchment except when the CEO-chair 
duality dummy (DUAL) is used as the Entrenchment proxy. Specifically, when LNTEN (log of CEO 
tenure) is the only Entrenchment proxy in the regression, its estimate is 0.004 and it is significant at 
the 1% level; the estimates for the parameters of interest are respectively 0.047 and -0.010 when 
CEOSH (CEO stock ownership share) and POD (percentage of outside directors) are separately used 
as the Entrenchment proxy in the regression, and both estimates are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. When used jointly in the regression, the three Entrenchment proxies retain parameter estimates 
with  the  same  signs,  similar  magnitude,  and  significance  levels  as  obtained  when  they  are  used 
separately in the regressions. 
Our model predicts that because entrenched CEOs are more difficult to remove, informed traders are 
more  likely  to  profit  from  private  information  and,  consequently,  make  greater  efforts  to  collect 21 
 
information.  These results confirm that PIN increases with CEO entrenchment for three of the four 
entrenchment proxies. 
4.2.2 The Reduced-Form FORCETURN Equation 
We now turn to estimating the reduced-form FORCETURN equation, which is specified as follows: 
FORCETURN = λ0 + λ*Entrenchment + λ2*Controls + η2,         (11) 
where Entrenchment and Controls are defined in the same way as in the reduced-form PIN equation. 
Here the dependent variable, FORCETURN, is a dummy  variable that equals either zero or one. 
Therefore, the fitted value of this regression characterizes the probability of ―success‖ – that is, the 
probability that FORCETURN=1. That said, the reduced-form FORCETURN equation specifies the 
probability of forced CEO turnover as a linear function of the degree of CEO entrenchment and the 
control variables. As discussed in Wooldridge (2002), this model of a binary-response dependent 
variable can be rewritten in terms of a latent variable y* as follows:  
y* = λ0 + λ1*Entrenchment + λ2*Controls + η2,                              (12) 
FORCETURN = 1[y*>0],                                                                  
where the symbol 1[.] is the indicator function. 
We use the Probit model to estimate the reduced-form FORCETURN equation.
15 Table 4 reports the 
MLE results, with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in firms. 
Looking at Table 4, we first discuss some results in relation to our control variables, which have been 
the focus of much previous research.  Notably, consistent with earlier findings in the CEO turnover 
literature, the probability of forced CEO turnover is highly significantly and negatively related to firm 
performance, measured by either accounting performance like ROA or market performance like one -
year stock return (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Warner, et al., 1988; Huson, et al., 2 001; Jenter and Kanaan, 
2006; Kaplan and Minton, 2006). The probability of forced CEO turnover is significantly and 
positively related to share turnover, suggesting that managers of more liquid firms are subject to more 
monitoring from the market and thus are more likely to be forced out of office. The relation between 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and analyst coverage is positive but quite weak and is only 
marginally significant at best. 
Two issues deserve more attention, though they are not our central focus.  Note that in line with some 
prior findings on the presence of weak-form relative performance evaluation (RPE) metrics in CEO 
                                                           
15 We also used the logit model or the linear probability model to estimate the reduced-form FORCETURN 
equation. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from using the Probit model, though the 
parameter estimates have different magnitudes due to the different model choices.  22 
 
turnover  decisions,  the  probability  of  forced  CEO  turnover  is  highly  significantly  and  positively 
related to benchmark performance as measured by industry returns (INTRET).  Whether or not boards 
of directors use the performance of other firms in the industry as a benchmark has been an empirical 
controversy. See Core, Guay, and Larker (2005) for a survey.  Some of the authors that have addressed 
this  issue  include,  among  others  not  listed,  Barro  and  Barro  (1990),  Jensen  and  Murphy  (1990), 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990), and Jenter and Kanaan (2006).  The weak-form RPE argument states that 
the  board  takes  at  least  some  account  of  the  benchmark  performance  in  evaluating  managerial 
performance and making CEO replacement decisions. Therefore, CEO dismissals should be negatively 
related to firm performance, holding the benchmark performance constant, and positively related to the 
benchmark performance, holding firm performance constant. Our empirical evidence thus lends strong 
support to the weak-form RPE in CEO turnover decisions. 
The second issue concerns institutional holdings and blockholders, which are not the same thing. 
Intriguingly,  the  relation  between  forced  CEO  turnover  and  institutional  holding  is  found  to  be 
significantly  negative  in  our  study.
16  Not surprisingly, the probability of forced CEO turnover is 
positively and significantly related to the number of  blockholders which some researchers  use as a 
measure of the quality of corporate governance (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).  Recall that 
the blockholder variable is the number of holders with a share greater than five percent of the total 
shares, so these are typically larger shareholders than the average institutional investor. The argument 
is that the more blockholders, the better is governance, due to stronger monitoring, so the higher is the 
likelihood  of  CEO  turnover.  Also,  the  probability  of  forced  CEO  turnover  is  positively  and 
significantly related to CEO age, reaffirming the earlier finding on the influence of age on the normal 
retirement and CEO succession process (e.g.,  Huson, et al., 2001; Kaplan and Minton, 2006). In 
addition, we do not find significant relations between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover with the 
following firm characteristics: firm size, stock‘s beta risk, stock‘s total return volatility, Tobin‘s q and 
firm age. 
Now, we turn to our main focus of interest, namely, the estimated coefficients on the Entrenchment 
proxies  in  the  reduced-form  FORCETURN  equation.  In  Models  (1)-(4)  we  study  the  four 
Entrenchment proxies separately in the reduced-form FORCETURN equation, and in Model (5) we 
jointly include the four Entrenchment proxies. All the five models clearly show that the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover is decreasing in the degree of Entrenchment. Specifically, when LNTEN is the 
only Entrenchment proxy in the regression, its estimate is -0.596 and is significant at the 1% level; if 
                                                           
16 The economic meaning of total institutional holding is unclear in empirical studies. Although some researchers 
tend to use the variable as a proxy for institutional monitoring, Chen, et al. (2007) document that it is at best a 
very noisy measure. Huson, et al. (2001) find no relation between the level of institutional holding and CEO 
turnover. Furthermore, dropping the total institutional holding variable from the regression does not qualitatively 
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the Entrenchment proxy is CEOSH in the regression, its estimate is -2.958 and it is significant at the 
1% level; when DUAL is the only Entrenchment proxy in the regression, its estimate is -0.327, again 
significant at the 1% level. The three variables, respectively standing for CEO tenure, CEO stock 
ownership, and CEO-chair duality, are positively correlated with each other; there is ample empirical 
evidence that these measures are inversely related to monitoring intensity and are positively related to 
weaker  corporate  governance/stronger  CEO  power  (e.g.,  Gibbons  and  Murphy,  1992;  Ryan  and 
Wiggins, 2004; Hermalin, 2005). That is, the higher their values, the stronger is CEO entrenchment. 
Consequently, using these three variables as proxies for CEO entrenchment, we obtain the results 
suggesting  that  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover  decreases  with  respect  to  the  degree  of 
entrenchment. 
When we use POD, the fraction of outside directors on the board, as the proxy for CEO entrenchment 
in the regression, the parameter of interest is estimated to be 1.098 and is significant at the 1% level. 
Because POD is well known to be positively related to monitoring intensity (e.g., see Weisbach, 1988; 
and Yermack, 1996) and, hence, negatively related to CEO entrenchment, this result again implies that 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases with monitoring and thus declines with entrenchment. 
Interestingly, when we jointly use the four proxies in the regression, only LNTEN and POD retain 
statistically  significant  coefficients,  which  are  negative  for  LNTEN  and  positive  for  POD;  the 
coefficients  for  the  other  two  proxies,  CEOSH  and  DUAL,  remain  negative  but  statistically 
insignificant,  suggesting  that  CEOSH  and  DUAL  likely  capture  similar  information  to  LNTEN, 
thereby losing their marginal power to LNTEN in predicting the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
To make sure that the results of Table 4 do not just reflect the effects of CEO turnover, we also 
estimate  a  bivariate  Probit  model  (see  also  Huson,  et  al.,  2001).  Besides  the  reduced-form 
FORCETURN equation, the bivariate Probit model contains another equation for CEOTURN which 
equals one if there is a CEO turnover (of any type) and zero otherwise. The specification for the 
CEOTURN equation is the same as that for the reduced-form FORCETURN equation. The estimated 
coefficients  in  the  reduced-form  FORCETURN  equation  from  the  bivariate  Probit  model  thus 
represent marginal effects on forced CEO turnover, conditional on CEO turnover taking place.
17  
Table 5 reports the estimation results from applying a maximum -likelihood bivariate probit model to 
the reduced-form FORCETURN equation; for brevity, we do not  show the estimation results for the 
CEOTURN equation (which are available upon request ). Because the results in Table 5 are very 
similar to the ones in Table 4, we focus on the key parameters of interest. In Models (1) -(3), when 
LNTEN, CEOSH, and DUAL are respectively used as the proxy for CEO entrenchment, their 
                                                           
17 Another way to capture the marginal effects of forced CEO turnover, controlling for CEO turnover, is to 
estimate a multinomial Probit/Logit model. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from using 
the bivariate Probit model. 24 
 
coefficient estimates are, respectively, -0.532, -2.719 and -0.356, and all are significant at the 1% 
level. In Model (4), when POD is used as the proxy for CEO entrenchment in the regression, the 
parameter of interest is estimated to be 1.016, significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that the 
likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover  is  significantly  negatively  related  to  CEO  tenure,  CEO  stock 
ownership and CEO-chair Duality and is significantly positively related to the fraction of outside 
directors sitting on the board. If we include the four proxies jointly in the regression as in Model (5), 
both LNTEN and DUAL retain significantly negative coefficient estimates; POD has a significantly 
positive coefficient; CEOSH has a negative but insignificant coefficient estimate. 
Overall, the results from both Table 4 and Table 5 confirm our model predictions. They clearly show 
that, whether or not we control for CEO turnover in the regressions, CEO entrenchment significantly 
affects the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. That is, the more entrenched the CEO is, the more 
difficult it is for the board to remove him from office. 
4.3 Structural Tests I: Equation-by-Equation Estimation 
We now proceed to test our model‘s two structural equations which form a simultaneous system. We 
first  take  the  partial-information  approach  by  estimating  the  system  equation-by-equation  in  this 
subsection, and then we adopt the full-information approach by estimating the system jointly in the 
next subsection. 
4.3.1 The Structural PIN Equation 
For ease of reference, below we reproduce the structural PIN equation of our empirical analysis: 
PIN = ʱ0 + ʱ*FORCETURN + ʱ2*Controls_PIN + ʵ1,                  (6) 
where  FORCETURN  is  the  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  for  forced  CEO  turnover  and  zero 
otherwise,  and  Controls_PIN  represents  a  set  of  control  variables  that  are  identified  as  PIN 
determinants in the literature (e.g., Easley, et al., 2002; Aslan, et al., 2006): firm size (LNME), ROA, 
one-year  stock  return  (RET1YR),  stock  beta  (BETA),  stock  return  volatility  (VOL1YR),  share 
turnover (LNSHTURN), Tobin‘s q (TOBIN), number of analysts (LNNUMEST), total institutional 
holding (INSTHOLD), firm age (LNFMAGE), industry dummies and year dummies.  
The parameter  of  interest in  equation  (6) is  the  coefficient associated  with  the  other  endogenous 
variable  in  the  structural  system,  FORCETURN.  Because  we  focus  on  equation-by-equation 
estimation, we specify FORCETURN in the format of the reduced form as in equation (12): 
y* = λ0 + λ*Entrenchment + λ2*Controls + η2,                              (12) 
FORCETURN = 1[y*>0].                                                                  25 
 
Note that Controls_PIN in the structural equation is a subset of Controls which we use as the control 
variables  (other  than  the  Entrenchment  proxies)  in  the  reduced-form  equations.    This  exclusion 
restriction imposed on the structural PIN equation enables us to identify this equation in the structural 
system. Further, because FORCETURN is a binary variable with values equal to zero or one, we 
estimate the structural PIN equation based on the method of Heckman (1978) or Maddala (1983). This 
method considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment (FORCETURN here) on 
another endogenous continuous variable (PIN here), conditional on two sets of independent variables 
for these two endogenous variables. 
Table 6 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the structural PIN equation, with robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering in firms. For brevity, we do not  show the estimation results for the 
reduced-form  FORCETURN  equation.  The  structural  PIN  equation  remains  the  same  across  all 
models;  the  reduced-form  FORCETURN  equation  includes  different  combinations  of  the  four 
Entrenchment  proxies:  the  four  proxies  entering  separately  into  the  reduced-form  FORCETURN 
equation in Models (1)-(4) and jointly into the reduced-form FORCETURN equation in Model (5). 
Consistent with earlier findings in the PIN literature (e.g., Easley et al., 2002), PIN is significantly and 
negatively related to firm size, share turnover, number of analysts, aggregate institutional holding, and 
firm age, and it is significantly and positively related to stock return volatility and Tobin‘s q.  PIN is 
found to not be significantly related to a firm‘s accounting performance, stock return performance, or a 
stock‘s beta risk. Also, the reported p-values for each model, which are for the Wald test on the 
independence of the two equations, provide some useful statistics for model diagnostics. Because the 
p-values are all smaller than 0.10 in four out of the five models except for the model whereas CEOSH 
is the single Entrenchment proxy in the FORCETURN equation, we can reject the hypothesis that the 
structural  PIN  equation  and  the  reduced-form  FORCETURN  equation  are  uncorrelated  with  each 
other. The mostly significant p-values illustrate the necessity of controlling for the endogeneity of 
FORCETURN  in  estimating  the  structural  PIN  equation,  which  Heckman‘s  (1978)  or  Maddala‘s 
(1983) method does. 
The parameter of interest in the structural PIN equation is the coefficient associated with the system‘s 
other  endogenous  variable,  FORCETURN.  As  shown  unequivocally  in  Table  6,  no  matter  which 
combination of the four Entrenchment proxies is used in the reduced-form FORCETURN equation, 
the estimated coefficient of interest is always significantly negative: the parameter values stay in the 
range between -0.012 and -0.009 and are all significant at the 5% level. This result indicates that PIN 
is negatively related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, thereby supporting one of the key 
predictions of our theoretical model -- as the likelihood of forced turnover increases, the probability of 
informed trading declines. According to our model, in case a CEO replacement happens, the firm‘s 
cash flow depends on the new manager‘s quality and the informed trader‘s information about the old 26 
 
CEO becomes less useful (or even useless), so the informed trader rationally spends less effort in 
collecting the information ex ante. In other words, the disciplining effort exercised by the board, in the 
form of CEO retentions/replacements, hurts the profitability of the informed trader. Thus, firms with 
higher likelihood of forced CEO turnovers have lower PINs. 
4.3.2 The Structural FORCETURN Equation 
Again for ease of reference, below we restate the structural FORCETURN equation: 
FORCETURN = β0 + β*PIN + β2*Controls_FORCETURN + β3*Entrenchment + ʵ2.       (7) 
Or equivalently,  
y* = β0 + β*PIN + β2*Controls_FORCETURN + β3*Entrenchment + ʵ2,              (8) 
FORCETURN = 1[y*>0],                                                                                          
where the symbol 1[.] is the indicator function, and Controls_FORCETURN represents a set of control 
variables  that  are  known  to  affect  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover  in  the  literature  (e.g., 
Weisbach, 1988; Warner, et al., 1988; Huson, et al., 2001):
18 firm size (LNME), ROA, one-year stock 
return (RET1YR), industry return (INDRET), share turnover (LNSHTURN), and Tobin‘s q (TOBIN), 
number of analysts (LNNUMEST), number of block holders (LNNUMBH), CEO age (LNCEOAGE), 
industry dummies and year dummies.  
Because  we  estimate  the simultaneous-equation  model  equation-by-equation  and  we  focus  on  the 
structural FORCETURN equation, we adopt the reduced-form PIN equation: 
PIN = π0 + π*Entrenchment + π2*Controls + η1,         (10) 
Note again that Controls_FORCETURN in the structural equation is a subset of Controls which we 
use as the control variables (other than the Entrenchment proxies) in the reduced-form equations. The 
ensuing variable exclusion restriction placed on the structural FORCETURN equation helps identify 
this equation. Moreover,  the structural equation is essentially a binary response model (FORCETURN 
here) with a continuous endogenous explanatory variable (PIN here), so we follow the discussion in 
Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 15.7.2) to estimate this equation. Such a model can be estimated by either 
a  two-step  approach  as  suggested  by  Rivers  and  Vuong  (1988)  or  a  one-step  MLE  approach  as 
suggested by Evans et al. (1992). But, because MLE is more efficient than the two-step approach and 
                                                           
18 For robustness, we also use a parsimonious set of variables for Control_FORCETURN: ROA, RET1YR, 
LNNUMEST, LNCEOAGE, industry dummies and year dummies, which are typically chosen as explanatory 
variables for CEO replacements in the literature (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Warner, et al., 1988; Huson, et al., 2001). 
The results, especially the estimates on the key parameters of interest, remain similar to the ones reported in the 
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yields direct estimates of the parameters of interest, we estimate the structural FORCETURN equation 
with MLE. 
Table 7 reports the MLE results for the structural FORCETURN equation, with robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering in firms. Reaffirming earlier findings, in all models, the likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to ROA or Tobin‘s q (TOBIN); the likelihood is 
significantly negatively related to the one-year stock return (RET1YR) but significantly positively 
related to the industry return (INDRET), consistent with the weak-form RPE argument that the board 
uses the benchmark measure to make CEO retention/replacement decisions. The likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover is significantly positively related to share turnover (LNSHRTURN), number of analysts 
(LNNUMEST) and CEO age (LNCEOAGE), and it is unrelated to firm size (LNME). Different from 
the reduced-form estimation results, the number of block holders (LNNUMBH) appears to have no 
role in affecting the likelihood of forced CEO turnover in the structural estimation. With regard to the 
coefficient on Entrenchment, the likelihood of forced turnover is strongly related to the degree of CEO 
entrenchment: negatively to CEO tenure (LNTEN), CEO stock ownership (CEOSH) and CEO-chair 
duality (DUAL), and positively to the fraction of outside directors (POD). These parameter estimates 
once more confirm the prediction of our theoretical model: a CEO is less likely to be removed when 
he is more entrenched and the board has to bear a higher cost of removing him. 
The  main  parameter  of  interest  in  this  structural  equation  is  the  coefficient  associated  with  the 
system‘s other endogenous variable, PIN. In four out of the five  specifications, this coefficient is 
estimated to be positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover increases as the probability of informed trading increases. The only exception is when the 
CEO-chair  duality  (DUAL)  is  used  as  the  single  CEO  entrenchment  proxy  in  the  structural 
FORCETURN  equation,  and  the  structural  coefficient  on  PIN  remains  positive  but  statistically 
insignificant. The results suggest that the boards of firms do make use of the market information to 
monitor CEOs, confirming the prediction of our theoretical model. According to our model, when the 
market  is  more  efficient  (in  the  sense  of  incorporating  private  information  into  stock  prices),  an 
unqualified CEO is more likely to be identified, and the board is more willing to make efforts to fire 
him.  
Table  7  also  reports  the  p-values  of  the  estimations  for  model  diagnostics.  The  p-values  are  the 
statistics  of  the  Wald  test  of  exogeneity,  that  is,  under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  structural 
FORCETURN equation is exogenous to the reduced-form PIN equation, i.e., the error term in the 
structural  FORCETURN  equation  and  the  error  term  in  the  reduced-form  PIN  equation  are 
uncorrelated.  It is clear that the p-values of the five model are all lower than 0.07 except for the model 
whereas DUAL is the single CEO entrenchment proxy in the structural FORCETURN equation. The 28 
 
low p-values indicate rejection of the null hypothesis and are in favor of the endogeneity of PIN in the 
empirical analysis, justifying our use of the estimation method of Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 15.7.2) 
to identify the impact of informed trading on board decisions regarding CEO replacements. 
Overall, the results from estimating the structural FORCETURN equation support the prediction of 
our theoretical model. That is, the board‘s optimal internal monitoring effort, in the form of CEO 
replacements, is increasing in the intensity of external information effort measured by the probability 
of informed trading; also, the board‘s optimal internal monitoring effort is decreasing in the degree of 
CEO entrenchment. 
4.4 Structural Tests II: Joint Estimation 
The equation-by-equation estimation of a simultaneous-equation model is well-known to be consistent 
but not efficient because such estimation fails to accommodate the correlation between the error terms 
of the two equations (e.g., Green, 2005). To gain efficiency (to the extent that the two equations in the 
system are correctly specified), we also carry out a joint estimation of the system. Because one of the 
endogenous variables in our system, FORCETURN, is a dummy  variable that takes on only two 
values, zero and one, the 3-Stage-Least-Square (3SLS) method typically used for the joint estimation 
of a simultaneous-equation model is not appropriate for our model.
19 Instead, we use the Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) method proposed by Amemiya (1979).  
The simultaneous-equation model consists of the structural PIN equation, as in equation (6), and the 
structural FORCETURN equation, as in equation (7) (or the equi valent representation  shown  by 
equations (8) and (9)). The two different sets of control variables used in the two structural equations 
implicitly impose an exclusion restriction on each of the two equations, thereby helping identify the 
system of equations.
20 Given the identification, the GLS method takes care of the endogeneity bias and 
the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, both associated with the estimation of a 
simultaneous-equation model. Compared to the equation -by-equation estimation which is a limited-
information test, the GLS approach is a full-information estimation method. 
Table 8 reports the GLS results from the joint estimation of the structural system, which are 
qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from the equation-by-equation estimation of the system. Note 
that,  because  we  use  five  different  combinations  of  Entrenchment  proxies  in  the  structural 
FORCETURN equation, the estimates for the structural PIN equation vary accordingly. 
                                                           
19 To start we actually fit a 3SLS model to our structural system, treating the structural FORCETURN equation 
as  a  linear  probability  model.  The  results  are  qualitatively  similar  to  the  ones  reported  in  the  text  and  are 
available upon request. 
20 The FORCETURN equation belongs to the set of limited -dependent-variable models, which is  essentially a 
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Let  us  first  examine  the  structural  PIN  equation.  Across  the  five  sets  of  estimates,  we  note  the 
following.  First, the coefficient on the other endogenous variable FORCETURN is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in four of the five cases; the only exception is when CEO-chair duality is 
used as the single proxy for CEO entrenchment; in that case, the coefficient on FORCETURN is 
negative but insignificantly different from zero. This result lends support to our model prediction that 
the informed trader‘s optimal effort to collect information is decreasing in the likelihood of the board‘s 
removing the CEO. Second, consistent with the PIN literature, PIN is negatively related to firm size, 
share turnover, analyst coverage, aggregate institutional holding and firm age and is positively related 
to stock return volatility and Tobin‘s q. 
Looking at the estimates of the structural FORCETURN equation, several patterns emerge. First, the 
coefficient on the other endogenous variable, PIN, is positive and significant at the 10% level in four 
out of the five cases; the only exception is again when CEO-chair duality is used as the single proxy 
for  CEO  entrenchment,  and  the  coefficient  on  PIN  remains  positive  but  becomes  statistically 
insignificant. This result confirms our model prediction that the board‘s optimal disciplining effort in 
the form of CEO replacement is increasing in the informed trader‘s effort to collect information. 
Second, the likelihood of forced CEO turnover relates significantly and negatively to CEO tenure, 
CEO stock ownership and CEO-chair duality, and the likelihood relates significantly and positively to 
the fraction of outside directors. The results support another prediction of our theoretic model that the 
board‘s optimal internal monitoring effort is decreasing in the degree of CEO entrenchment. Third, for 
all five model specifications, the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is significantly negatively related 
to the firm-level stock return but significantly positively to the industry-level return, supporting the 
weak-form  RPE  argument  that  the  board  uses  the  benchmark  performance  to  make  CEO 
retention/replacement  decisions.  Finally,  across  all  the  five  model  specifications,  the  estimated 
coefficients on ROA and Tobin‘s q are significantly negative; the estimated coefficients on share 
turnover, analyst coverage, and CEO age are significantly positive; and the estimated coefficients on 
firm size and block holding are statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with most of the 
above findings based on the reduced-form estimation and the partial-information structural estimation, 
and they also echo the earlier findings by the CEO turnover literature. 
In summary, the results from the full-information approach estimation show that, in four out of five 
cases, the PIN equation has a significantly negative loading on FORCETURN, and the FORCETURN 
equation  has  a  significantly  positive  coefficient  on  PIN.  Also  for  the  structural  FORCETURN 
equation, the signs of the estimated coefficients on different CEO entrenchment proxies are consistent 
with the notion that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover declines with respect to the degree of CEO 
entrenchment. These  results  lend  strong  support to  our  model  predictions.  That  is,  if  we  use  the 
probability of informed trading as the proxy for external  information effort and the likelihood of 30 
 
forced CEO turnover as the proxy for internal monitoring of the board, then the external information 
effort is decreasing in the board‘s internal monitoring effort; in contrast, the board‘s optimal internal 
monitoring effort is increasing in the intensity of external information effort. Moreover, the likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover is decreasing in the degree of CEO entrenchment. 
5. Extension: Impact of Regulatory Oversight (on Informed Trading) 
Our theoretical model predicts a positive relation between the degree of entrenchment and market 
efficiency, i.e., the extent of private information production in the market.  In this section, we use our 
model to examine a particular example of an exogenous shift in regulatory oversight that possibly 
brought about a change in CEO entrenchment. If the change in regulations reduces CEO entrenchment 
and lowers the cost of the board‘s monitoring effort, then, according to our model prediction, it will 
also reduce the intensity of informed trading in the market. We examine this prediction with regard to 
one episode of the regulatory oversight change: the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX), which aims to strengthen governance in corporate America in response to a series of corporate 
scandals and collapses in the first few year of the 21
st century.  The SOX Act is the most important 
legislation affecting corporate reporting and governance in the U.S. since the 1930s, yet it has been 
very controversial and there is a large, but inconclusive literature on the subject; see, e.g., Romano 
(2005), Coates (2007), Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), and the references therein.  If SOX has been 
effective, then we expect that the activeness of informed trading in the market decreases after it was 
enacted, that is, PIN goes down in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period. 
We define a dummy variable, DSOX, which is equal to one for the post-SOX period (i.e., fiscal years 
2003 through 2005), and zero otherwise.
21 Table 9, Panel A shows the summary statistics of the four 
CEO entrenchment proxies for the pre-SOX period (DSOX=0) and the post-SOX period (DSOX=1) 
respectively. It is clear that SOX appears to have reduced CEO entrenchment and strengthened the 
board‘s monitoring of CEOs: after SOX, CEO tenure, CEO stock ownership, and percentage of CEO-
Chair duality all decrease and the fraction of outsiders sitting on the board increases. Specifically, the 
average value of CEO tenure reduces from 7.4 years (LNTEN=2.004) in the pre-SOX period to 6.5 
years (LNTEN=1.873) in the post-SOX period; CEO stock ownership declines from 2.92% in the pre-
SOX period to 2.00% in the post-SOX period; the percentage of CEO also serving as the board‘s chair 
shrinks from 67.92% in the pre-SOX period to 60.11% in the post-SOX period; and the fraction of 
outsider board members rises from 77.28% in the pre-SOX period to 81.90% in the post-SOX period. 
Table 9, Panel B reports the pairwise correlations between the SOX dummy variable and the four CEO 
                                                           
21 Including fiscal year 2002 in the post-SOX period yields similar result. Note that, here, we drop from our 
sample the observations for fiscal year 2006. Due to the data availability when we started this project, we have 
significantly fewer cases of (forced) CEO turnover for 2006 (see Table 2 and Footnote 14), which causes the 
lack of power in testing for the impact of SOX on forced CEO turnover and, in turn, on PIN. 31 
 
entrenchment  proxies.  Consistent  with  the  summary  statistics,  the  dummy  variable  is  negatively 
correlated  with  CEO  tenure,  CEO  stock  ownership,  and  CEO-Chair  duality,  and  it  is  positively 
correlated with fraction of outsider board members; all these correlation coefficients are significant 
with p-value equal to zero. 
Given the evidence that SOX has exerted an impact on CEO entrenchment, we include the SOX 
dummy, DSOX, but not the four proxies for CEO entrenchment when specifying empirical models for 
the PIN equation and the FORCETURN equation.
22 Table 10 reports the estimation results for the 
reduced-form FORCETURN equation (in the left half) and the reduced -form PIN equation (in the 
right half). Let us first look at the FORCETURN equation. As expected, the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover increases in the post-SOX period after controlling for other factors that may also affect the 
board‘s decision on CEO turnover. Specifically, if we include the year dummies for 1996-2002 in the 
reduced-form FORCETURN equation, the estimated coefficient on DSOX equals 0.216 with a robust 
standard error of 0.110; if we exclude the year dummies in the FORCETURN equation, the estimated 
coefficient on DSOX equals 0.129 with a robust standard error of 0.058; both estimates are significant 
at the 5% level. Against the backdrop of the tension between the board‘s monitoring effort and the 
informed traders‘ information production, an increase in the likelihood of forced CEO turnover after 
SOX implies a decrease in the intensity of informed trading in the market. This is exactly the case 
when we examine the results for the reduced-form PIN equation. As shown in the right half of Table 
10, if we include the year dummies for 1996-2002 into the reduced-form PIN equation, the estimated 
coefficient on DSOX equals -0.029 with a robust standard error of 0.002; if we exclude the year 
dummies in the PIN equation, the estimated coefficient on DSOX equals -0.006 with a robust standard 
error of 0.002; both estimates are significant at the 1% level. 
We also estimate the structural PIN equation by including DSOX in the model. Table 11 presents the 
estimation  results.  Consistent  with  our  prior  results,  PIN  is  negatively  related  to  FORCETURN, 
suggesting  that  the  increased  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover  reduces  the  informed  trader‘s 
incentive to engage in informed trading. Moreover, PIN is again negatively correlated with the SOX 
dummy, DSOX. With the year dummies for 1996-2002 included in the structural specification of the 
PIN equation, the estimated coefficient on DSOX is -0.028 with a robust standard error of 0.002 and is 
significant the 1% level; if we do not include the year dummies in the PIN equation, the estimated 
                                                           
22 If  we include the  four CEO entrenchment proxies along  with the SOX dummy in  empirical  models, the 
coefficient estimate on DSOX becomes insignificant and the coefficient estimates on the entrenchment proxies 
remain significant with the same signs as in the above-reported results. The loss of statistical significance on 
DSOX can be attributable to the fact that SOX has affected the entrenchment proxies and that DSOX, as a 
dummy variable, is less informative or powerful than the entrenchment proxies in characterizing the relations of 
interest. 32 
 
coefficient on DSOX is -0.007 with a robust standard error of 0.002 and is also significant at the 1% 
level. 
In summary, using both reduced-form specifications and structural specifications, we find that the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover increases significantly after SOX; we also find that PIN decreases 
significantly in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period.  This evidence is consistent with 
our  model  prediction:  PIN  goes  down  if  there  is  an  exogenous  shift  in  regulatory  oversight  that 
reduces  managerial  entrenchment  and  strengthens  the  board‘s  monitoring  of  firm  managers.  The 
channel through which the regulatory change affects informed trading is illustrated in our model, that 
is, the tension between the board‘s monitoring effort and the informed trader‘s information production 
effort. 
 6. Conclusion  
The efficiency of stock prices can be used to improve social efficiency if the information in stock 
prices is used to make allocative decisions by firms (see Dow and Gorton 1997).  We examine the 
interaction between the production of information by participants in the stock market and the decisions 
of firms. What is the link between stock market efficiency and economic efficiency?  We present a 
theoretical model to investigate how the board of directors‘ monitoring of the CEO is related to the 
extent of private information production about that firm in the stock market. Although the board can 
use the private information reflected in the stock market to guide the managerial turnover decisions, 
the board‘s reaction to the market information feeds back to create a disincentive for the informed 
trader to collect information in the first place. The interaction between the board‘s decision and the 
informed trader‘s decision determines the equilibrium informativeness of stock prices and the intensity 
of  board  monitoring.  The  market  price  incorporates  the  informed  trader‘s  information,  which  is 
retrospective, and the board‘s turnover decision, which is prospective.  Information produced in the 
stock  market  is  highest  with  regard  to  firms  that  are  the  least  likely  to  use  that  information  for 
allocative decisions.  Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. 
We then empirically test the models‘ predictions. We analyze both the reduced form and the structural 
form of the equations that characterize the equilibrium of our model. In particular, we estimate a 
simultaneous-equation system that incorporates the interaction between the decisions of the informed 
traders and the decisions of the board of directors.  Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps, 
gradually adding more structure to the equations to be estimated.  We start with reduced forms, which 
impose the least structure, and end by imposing the most structure in the full simultaneous system.  
Our empirical analysis confirms our model predictions.  That is, if we use the probability of informed 
trading (PIN) as the proxy for the decisions of the informed traders and the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover  as  the  proxy  for  board  monitoring,  then  informed  trading  is  decreasing  in  the  board‘s 33 
 
monitoring  effort;  in  contrast,  the  board‘s  optimal  monitoring  effort  is  increasing  in  the 
informativeness of price. Moreover, the degree of CEO entrenchment has an impact on the interaction 
between informed trading and CEO turnover. 
Finally,  we  evaluate  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  finding  that  with  respect  to  corporate 
governance, the Act reduced managerial entrenchment. Accordingly it has created a disincentive for 
informed  trading.  In  some  sense,  the  feedback  effect  moderates  the  effectiveness  of  changes  in 
regulations.    34 
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Appendix: Derivation of Log-likelihoods for MLE 
For notational convenience, define 
X1={1, Controls_PIN}, the set of exogenous variables in the structural equation of PIN; 
X2={1, Controls_FORCETURN, Entrenchment Proxies}, the set of exogenous variables in the 
structural equation of FORCETURN;  
Controls={1, Controls_PIN, Controls_FORCETURN}, the set of all exogenous variables except for 
CEO entrenchment proxies; and 
X={X1,X2}≡{Controls, Entrenchment Proxies}, the set of all exogenous variables in the system.  
Part 1: The structural PIN equation 
The derivation of the likelihood follows Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983). 
The system used to estimate the structural PIN equation is: 
PIN = ʱ0 + ʱ*FORCETURN + ʱ2*Controls_PIN + ʵ1 ≡ ʱ*FORCETURN + ʱ*X1 + ʵ1,      (A.1) 
and 
FORCETURN = λ0+ λ*Entrenchment + λ2*Controls + η2 ≡ λ*X + η2,                (A.2) 
where ʵ1 and η2 are bivariate normal with mean zero, Var(ʵ1)= ˃ʵ
2, Var(η2)=1 and Corr(ʵ1,η2)=ρ1. 
Rewrite equation (A.2) as follows:  
y*= λ*X + η2                                                        (A.2a) 
D≡FORCETURN = 1[y*>0].            (A.2b) 
Step 1. Rewrite the above equations into the reduced-form system as 
PIN = π1*X1 + π2*X2 + v1,                (A.3a) 
y*=  λ*X + η2                                                       (A.2a) 
D= 1[y*>0],                                        (A.2b) 
Given the identification of the system, we can solve the structural parameter estimates ʱ from the 
reduced-form parameter estimates π as (see Heckman (1978) for the functional form): 
ʱ=g(π), or π=g
-1(ʱ).                            (A.3b) 39 
 
Step 2. Based on the reduced-form, we can write down the joint density of (PIN, D) as follows: 
*X 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 - *X - ( , D) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) ) ( .3 )
DD f PIN h v d h v d A c

    
 
    
where v1=PIN - π1*X1 - π2*X2 , and h(.,.) is the pdf of a bivariate normal distribution. 
Substituting equation (A.3b) into equation (A.3c), we can rewrite the joint density in terms of the 
identified structural parameters ʱ.  
Specifically, the log likelihood for an observation is as follows: 
Loglike = D*{ln[ʦ(V1)]-0.5*[(PIN-ʱ*X1- ʱ)/˃ʵ]
2-0.5*ln[2π˃ʵ
2]} + 
    (1-D)*{ln[ʦ(V2)]-0.5*[(PIN-ʱ*X1)/˃ʵ]
2-0.5*ln[2π˃ʵ
2]},                                (A.4) 
where Φ is the cdf of a standard normal distribution, 
           V1= [λ*X +(PIN-ʱ*X1- ʱ)*ρ1/˃ʵ]/[1- ρ1
2]
0.5, and 
           V2= [-λ*X-(PIN-ʱ*X1)*ρ1/˃ʵ]/[1- ρ1
2]
0.5.   
Sum over all the observations and we obtain the likelihood function for MLE. 
 
Part 2: The structural FORCETURN equation 
The derivation of the likelihood follows Wooldrige (2002, Chapter 15.7.2). 
The system used to estimate the structural FORCETURN equation is: 
y* = β0 + β*PIN + β2*Controls_FORCETURN + β3*Entrenchment + ʵ2 ≡ β*PIN+ β*X2+ ʵ2    (A.5a) 
D≡FORCETURN = 1[y*>0],                                                                                            (A.5b) 
and 
PIN = π0 + π*Entrenchment + π2*Controls + η1 ≡ π*X+ η1                                               (A.6) 
Note that, under the joint normality of (ʵ2, η1), with Var(ʵ2)=1 which is normalized so as to identify the 
parameters of an ordinary Probit model, we decompose ʵ2 as  
ʵ2=ρ2/˃η*η1 + e1                                                                                                    (A.7) 
where ρ2 is the correlation between ʵ2 and η1, ˃η is the standard error of η1, and e1 is independent of X 
and η1. Note that e1 is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1- ρ2
2. 
Thus, the joint density of (D, PIN) is  
f(D,PIN|X) = f(D|PIN, X)*f(PIN|X)  40 
 
       = {ʦ(W)}
D *{1-ʦ(W)}
(1-D) *(1/˃η)*φ[(PIN- γ*X)/˃η],                      (A.8) 
where ʦ and φ are the cdf and pdf of a normal distribution, and 
           W≡ β*PIN+ β*X2+ ρ2/˃η*(PIN- π*X)/(1- ρ2
2)
0.5. 




Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Panel  A  presents  summary  statistics  of  the  probability  of  informed  trading  (PIN),  CEO  turnover 
(CEOTURN), Forced CEO turnover (FORCETURN), and proxies for the cost of firing CEOs such as 
logarithm  value  of  CEO  tenure  (LNTEN),  CEO  serving  as  a  board  chair  (DUAL),  CEO‘s  stock 
ownership  as  a  ratio  of  a  company‘s  total  shares  outstanding  (CEOSH),  and  fraction  of  outside 
directors on the board (POD), for a sample of firms covered in Execucomp database over the period 
from  1995  to  2006.  All  the  three  variables,  CEOTURN,  FORCETURN  and  DUAL,  are  dummy 
variables, whereas CEOTURN equals one if the CEO changes in one specific year and zero otherwise, 
FORCETURN is set to one if the CEO turnover is forced and to zero otherwise, and DUAL equals one 
if a CEO is also the chair of the firm's board and zero otherwise.  Panel B shows the correlations 
among the variables, with p-values in parentheses. Panel C lists summary statistics of control variables 
such  as  logged  value  of  market  capitalization  (LNME),  ROA,  one-year  firm-level  stock  return 
(RET1YR), one-year industry return (INDRET), stock beta (BETA), one-year stock return volatility 
(VOL1YR), logged share turnover (LNSHTURN), Tobin‘s Q (TOBIN), logged value of one plus 
number of analysts (LNNUMEST), proportion of a company‘s shares held by all institutional investors 
(INSTHOLD), logged value of one plus the number of block holders (LNNUMBH), logged value of 
firm age (LNFMAGE), and logged value of CEO age (LNCEOAGE). We calculate ROA as the ratio 
of operating income after depreciation (item 178) to total assets (item 6). We calculate RET1YR as the 
cumulative monthly returns over the past twelve months. We estimate BETA from fitting the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to a company‘s monthly stock returns over the past five years. We 
annualize the standard deviation in daily stock returns over the past one year to obtain VOL1YR. We 
divide the total number of shares traded (item 28) by the total number of shares outstanding (item 25) 
and take logs on the ratio to obtain LNSHTURN. We calculate TOBIN as the ratio of the market value 
of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets 
(item 6) plus the market value of common equity (item 25 times item 199) minus the book value of 
common  equity  (item  60)  and  balance  sheet  deferred  taxes  (item  74).  If  the  number  of  analyst 
information for a firm is missing, we set the number to zero.  We compute INSTHOLD as the ratio of 
the total number of shares held by all institutions to the total number of shares outstanding.  We 
calculate  LNFMAGE  as  the  logarithm  value  of  the  number  of  years  since  the  CRSP  begins  its 
coverage  of  a  firm.  We  use  Fama-French‘s  49-industry  classification,  and  for  each  of  these  49 
industries, we sum over the one-year stock returns of all the firms of this industry with equal weights 
to calculate INDRET. Block holders refer to the institutional investors owning more than 5% of a 










Panel A. Summary statistics of PIN, FORCETURN, and proxies for cost of firing CEOs 
  Nobs  Mean  Std  Min  Max  1%  Median  99% 
PIN  16,726  0.150  0.072  0  1  0.017  0.140  0.351 
CEOTURN  16,726  0.099  0.299  0  1  0  0  1 
FORCETURN  16,726  0.024  0.153  0  1  0  0  1 
LNTEN  16,726  1.962  0.766  0  4.111  0.693  1.946  3.664 
CEOSH  16,726  0.026  0.063  0  0.642  0  0.003  0.336 
DUAL  16,726  0.655  0.475  0  1  0  1  1 
POD  14,504  0.790  0.120  0  1  0.4  0.818  0.933 
 
Panel B. Sample correlations 
  PIN  FORCETURN  LNTEN  CEOSH  DUAL  POD 
PIN  1.0000 
           
FORCETURN  0.0092 
(0.232)  1.0000          
LNTEN  0.0620 
(0.000)  
-0.1413 
(0.000)   1.0000          





(0.000)   1.0000       







(0.000)   1.0000    












Panel C. Summary statistics of control variables 
  Nobs  Mean  Std  Min  Max  1%  Median  99% 
LNME  16,726  7.390  1.636  0.642  13.299  3.668  7.298  11.537 
ROA  16,726  0.084  0.129  -3.076  0.930  -0.353  0.085  0.348 
RET1YR  16,726  0.201  0.640  -0.982  14.943  -0.768  0.126  2.5 
INDRET  16,726  0.264  0.313  -0.594  3.262  -0.306  0.224  1.404 
BETA  16,726  1.061  0.745  -1.919  5.800  -0.110  0.926  3.557 
VOL1YR  16,726  0.428  0.232  0.096  4.261  0.144  0.368  1.209 
LNSHTURN  16,726  0.236  0.798  -3.373  12.937  -1.516  0.189  2.129 
TOBIN  16,726  2.018  1.885  0.360  78.565  0.746  1.474  8.961 
LNNUMEST  16,726  1.740  0.696  0  3.481  0  1.778  3.080 
INSTHOLD  16,726  0.610  0.202  3.42e-3  0.9997  0.116  0.630  0.968 
LNNUMBH  16,726  0.927  0.500  0  2.277  0  1.012  1.833 
LNFMAGE  16,726  2.943  0.782  1.099  4.407  1.386  2.996  4.369 
LNCEOAGE  16,726  4.037  0.135  3.367  4.533  3.689  4.043  4.357 
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Table 2. Annual Breakdown of PIN, CEO Turnover, and Forced CEO turnover across (Fiscal) 
Years: 1995-2006 
 
year  Nobs  PIN  CEOTURN  FORCETURN 
    Mean  Std  Mean  Std  Mean  Std 
1995  1,360   0.180   0.059   0.099   0.299   0.018   0.132  
1996  1,407   0.179   0.065   0.092   0.290   0.020   0.140  
1997  1,406   0.148   0.055   0.102   0.302   0.026   0.160  
1998  1,463   0.143   0.063   0.107   0.309   0.025   0.157  
1999  1,489   0.151   0.100   0.109   0.312   0.021   0.145  
2000  1,469   0.153   0.123   0.128   0.334   0.033   0.178  
2001  1,440   0.153   0.121   0.110   0.313   0.023   0.150  
2002  1,415   0.136  0.102   0.100   0.301   0.035   0.185  
2003  1,447   0.133   0.062   0.096   0.295   0.031   0.174  
2004  1,414   0.137   0.072   0.093   0.291   0.017   0.129  
2005  1,408   0.137   0.080   0.099   0.299   0.022   0.147  




Table 3. Estimation of the Reduced-Form PIN Equation 
This table reports the OLS estimation results on the reduced-form PIN equation using data over 1995-
2006.  Firms  are  classified  into  one  of  the  Fama-French  49  industries.  Estimates  on  the  industry 
dummies  and  year  dummies  are  suppressed  to  save  space.  Robust  standard  errors  adjusted  for 
clustering in firms are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote (two-sided) significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 












































































































































LNTEN  0.004*** 
(0.001)        0.003*** 
(0.001) 
CEOSH    0.047*** 
(0.016)      0.035** 
(0.017) 
DUAL      -0.002 
(0.002) 
  -0.003 
(0.002) 
















           
Sample Size  16,726  16,726  16,726  14,504  14,504 
R
2  0.307  0.307  0.306  0.286  0.288 45 
 
Table 4. Estimation of the Reduced-Form FORCETURN Equation: Using Probit Models 
This table reports the estimation results from fitting a maximum-likelihood probit model on the 
reduced-form FORCETURN equation using data over 1995-2006. The dependent variable is 
FORCETURN, which equals one if the CEO turnover is forced and zero otherwise. Firms are 
classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the industry dummies and year 
dummies are suppressed to save space. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in firms are 
reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 












































































































































LNTEN  -0.596*** 
(0.041) 
      -0.579*** 
(0.049) 
CEOSH    -2.958*** 
(1.097) 
    -0.244 
(0.779) 
DUAL      -0.327*** 
(0.052) 
  -0.091 
(0.059) 
















Sample Size  16,726  16,726  16,726  14,504  14,504 
Pseudo R
2  0.228  0.148  0.151  0.141  0.227 
Loglikelihood  -1,455.18  -1,605.12  -1,599.52  -1,375.46  -1,237.03 46 
 
Table 5. Estimation of the Reduced-Form FORCETURN Equation: Bivariate Probit Models 
This table reports the estimation results from applying a maximum-likelihood bivariate probit model 
to the reduced-form FORCETURN equation. The dependent variable is FORCETURN, which equals 
one if the CEO turnover is forced and zero otherwise. The reported coefficient estimates are for 
regressions that are jointly estimated with the CEOTURN equation in which the dependent variable 
equals one if there is CEO turnover and zero otherwise. The CEOTURN relation in all models is the 
same as the FORCETURN equation, and its estimation results are suppressed for brevity. The sample 
period is 1995-2006.  Firms are classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the 
industry dummies and year dummies are suppressed to save space. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering in firms are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote (two-sided) significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 












































































































































LNTEN  -0.532*** 
(0.028) 
      -0.503*** 
(0.040) 
CEOSH    -2.719*** 
(0.735) 
    -0.200 
(0.802) 
DUAL      -0.356*** 
(0.052) 
  -0.136** 
(0.066) 
















Sample Size  16,726  16,726  16,726  14,504  14,504 
Loglikelihood  -1,455.18  -1,605.12  -1,599.52  -1,375.46  -1,237.03 47 
 
Table 6. Estimation of the Structural System: the PIN Equation 
This table reports the maximum likelihood estimates on the PIN equation in the structural system. The 
dependent variable of interest is PIN, and the endogenous variable on the right hand-side of this 
equation  is  FORCETURN.  The  FORCETURN  relation  follows  a  reduced-form  probit  model 
specification:  
     Prob(FORCETURN) = λ0+ λ1*LNME+ λ2*ROA+λ3*RET1YR+ λ4*INDRET+ λ5*BETA 
     + λ6*VOL1YR+ λ7*LNSHTURN+ λ8*TOBIN+ λ 9*LNNUMEST+ λ10*INSTOHOLD 
     + λ11*LNNUMBH + λ12*LNFMAGE+ λ13*LNCEOAGE+ λ14*PROXY_FIRE + INDUSTRY/YEAR, 
where PROXY_FIRE represents the cost of firing a CEO. The proxy is LNTEN, CEOSH, DUAL, and 
POD in Models (1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively, and the four proxies are jointly used in Model (5). 
Estimation results on the FORCETURN relation are suppressed for brevity. The sample period is 
1995-2006. Firms are classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the industry 
dummies and year dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in firms 
are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The p-value is for the Wald test on the independence of the two equations. 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 




































































































































P-value  0.081  0.237  0.031  0.088  0.077 
Sample Size  16,726  16,726  16,726  14,504  14,504 
Loglikelihood  21,860.54  21,704.19  21,706.86  18,573.57  18,715.93 48 
 
Table 7. Estimation of the Structural System: the FORCETURN Equation 
This table reports the maximum likelihood estimates on the FORCETURN equation in the structural 
system. The dependent variable of interest is FORCETURN, and the endogenous variable on the right 
hand-side of this equation is PIN. The reduced-form PIN relation is specified as follows:  
   PIN= π0+ π1*LNME+ π2*ROA+ π3*RET1YR+ π4*INDRET+ π5*BETA+ π6*VOL1YR 
      + π7*LNSHTURN + π8* TOBIN + π9*LNNUMEST+ π10*INSTHOLD+ π11*LNNUMBH 
      + π12*LNFMAGE+ π13*LNCEOAGE+ π14*PROXY_FIRE + INDUSTRY/YEAR DUMMIES, 
where PROXY_FIRE represents the cost of firing a CEO. The proxy is LNTEN, CEOSH, DUAL, and 
POD in Models (1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively, and the four proxies are jointly used in Model (5). 
Estimation results on the PIN relation are suppressed for brevity. The sample period is 1995-2006. 
Firms are classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the industry dummies and 
year dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in firms are reported in 
parentheses.    *,  **,  and  ***  denote  (two-sided)  significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels, 
respectively. The p-value is for the Wald test of exogeneity, whereas the null hypothesis is that PIN is 
exogenous to the structural FORCETURN equation, i.e, the error term in the structural FORCETURN 



























  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 














































































































LNTEN  -0.585*** 
(0.045) 
      -0.539*** 
(0.062) 
CEOSH    -2.846*** 
(0.997) 
    -0.396 
(0.722) 
DUAL      -0.308*** 
(0.055) 
  -0.051 
(0.059) 
















P-value  0.065  0.049  0.287  0.031  0.027 
Sample Size  16,726  16,726  16,726  14,504  14,504 
Loglikelihood  21,927.28  21,775.24  21,766.84  18,625.26  18,787.69 49 
 
Table 8. Joint Estimation of the Structural System 
This table reports the joint estimation results for the structural system of simultaneous equations using the Generalized Least Square method proposed by Amemiya 
(1979). Eqn1 and Eqn2 refer to the structural equations for PIN and FORCETURN, respectively. The sample period is 1995-2006. Firms are classified into one of 
the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the industry dummies and year dummies are not reported.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote (two-sided) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Eqn1  Eqn2  Eqn1  Eqn2  Eqn1  Eqn2  Eqn1  Eqn2  Eqn1  Eqn2 
INTERCEPT  0.299***  -8.361***  0.289***  -7.721**  0.310***  -6.342***  0.292***  -7.671***  0.298***  -9.986*** 
(0.006)  (1.438)  (0.008)  (1.458)  (0.007)  (1.314)  (0.008)  (1.535)  (0.007)  (1.720) 
PIN    5.386*    6.878**    3.009    7.193**    8.093** 
  (3.003)    (3.143)    (2.877)    (3.085)    (3.567) 
FORCETURN  -0.007***    -0.014***    -7.55e-4    -0.010***    -0.006***   
(0.001)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.001)   
LNME  -0.016***  0.050  -0.017***  0.073  -0.016***  0.025  -0.017***  0.064  -0.016***  0.080 
(0.001)  (0.062)  (0.001)  (0.064)  (0.001)  (0.059)  (0.001)  (0.064)  (0.001)  (0.071) 
ROA  0.006  -0.658***  2.22e-5  -0.711***  0.011**  -0.804***  -0.009  -0.759***  -0.006  -0.630*** 
(0.005)  (0.159)  (0.005)  (0.159)  (0.005)  (0.152)  (0.006)  (0.193)  (0.006)  (0.207) 
RET1YR  -0.003*  -0.816***  -0.008***  -0.808***  0.002  -0.801***  -0.005*  -0.732***  -0.002  -0.765*** 
(0.002)  (0.081)  (0.003)  (0.078)  (0.002)  (0.078)  (0.002)  (0.083)  (0.002)  (0.088) 
INDRET    0.413***    0.445***    0.390***    0.449***    0.461*** 
    (0.102)    (0.103)    (0.099)    (0.110)    (0.116) 
BETA  4.37e-4    3.24e-4    5.33e-4    0.001    0.001   
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
VOL1YR  0.026***    0.023***    0.028***    0.026***    0.027***   
(0.005)    (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
LNSHTURN  -0.008***  0.237***  -0.010***  0.198***  -0.012***  0.180***  -0.008***  0.204***  -0.009***  0.255*** 
(0.001)  (0.049)  (0.001)  (0.048)  (0.001)  (0.046)  (0.001)  (0.047)  (0.001)  (0.051) 50 
 
TOBIN  0.003***  -0.046*  0.003***  -0.049**  0.003***  -0.044*  0.005***  -0.072**  0.005***  -0.074** 
(3.83e-4)  (0.025)  (4.47e-4)  (0.024)  (3.41e-4)  (0.024)  (4.46e-4)  (0.029)  (4.84e-4)  (0.032) 
LNNUMEST  -0.005***  0.093*  -0.004***  0.089  -0.006***  0.096*  -0.005***  0.123**  -0.005***  0.135** 
(0.001)  (0.057)  (0.001)  (0.057)  (0.001)  (0.055)  (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.001)  (0.065) 
INSTHOLD  -0.021***    -0.024***    -0.019***    -0.029***    -0.026***   
(0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
LNNUMBH    -0.010 
(0.057) 
  -0.025 
(0.056) 
  0.007 
(0.055) 
  0.023 
(0.062) 
  0.019 
(0.065) 
LNFMAGE  -0.008***    -0.008***    -0.008***    -0.008***    -0.008***   
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
LNCEOAGE    1.430***    0.813***    0.866***    0.668***    1.528*** 
  (0.212)    (0.201)    (0.191)    (0.216)    (0.245) 
LNTEN    -0.615***                -0.606*** 
  (0.039)                (0.045) 
CEOSH        -3.107***            -0.422 
      (0.709)            (0.708) 
DUAL            -0.316***        -0.062 
          (0.052)        (0.064) 
POD                1.148***    0.714** 
              (0.266)    (0.284) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size       16,726      16,726        16,726      16,726        16,726      16,726      14,504     14,504     14,504     14,504 
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Table 9. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
The variable DSOX is a dummy variable that is equal to one if (fiscal) year is during the period of 
2003 to 2006, and to zero otherwise. The four entrenchment proxies are defined as in Table 1. The 
sample period is 1995-2005 (the observations for year 2006 are dropped due to the insufficient 
observations for FORCETURN). Panel A reports the summary statistics of the four entrenchment 
proxies for the pre-SOX period (DSOX=0) and the post-SOX period (DSOX=1). Panel B presents the 
pairwise correlations of the five variables with p-values reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics  
 Nobs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Median 
DSOX=0          
LNTEN 11,449  2.004  0.771  0  4.111  1.946 
SHROWNPC 11,449  0.029  0.067  0  0.642  0.004 
CEOCHAIR 11,449 0.679  0.467  0  1  1 
PODN 9,547  0.773  0.128  0  1  0.8 
          
DSOX=1          
LNTEN 4,269  1.873  0.751  0  4.025  1.792 
SHROWNPC 4,269  0.020  0.055  0  0.583  0.003 
CEOCHAIR 4,269 0.601 0.490  0  1  1 
PODN 3,982  0.819  0.097  0  1  0.857 
 
Panel B. Pairwise Correlations 
 DSOX  LNTEN  SHROWNPC  CEOCHAIR  PODN 
DSOX  1.0000      
LNTEN -0.0759 
(0.000) 
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Table 10. Estimation of the Reduced-Form FORCETURN Equation and PIN Equation 
This table reports the estimation results on the reduced-form FORCETURN equation (in the left half) 
and the reduced-form PIN equation (in the right half) using data over 1995-2005. We fit a maximum-
likelihood probit model on the FORCETURN equation, and we estimate the PIN equation with the 
OLS regression method. Firms are classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on 
the industry dummies and year dummies are suppressed to save space. Robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering in firms are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote (two-sided) significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  FORCETURN  FORCETURN    PIN  PIN 
INTERCEPT  -4.219*** 
(0.814) 
-4.300*** 




LNME  -0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.023 




ROA  -0.746*** 
(0.153) 
-0.756*** 




RET1YR  -0.769*** 
(0.118) 
-0.755*** 




INDRET  0.364*** 
(0.085) 
0.313*** 




BETA  -0.012 
(0.044) 
-0.033 




VOL1YR  -0.200 
(0.181) 
-0.099 




LNSHTURN  0.214*** 
(0.041) 
0.219*** 




TOBIN  -0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.033 




LNNUMEST  0.099* 
(0.057) 
0.098* 




INSTHOLD  -0.881*** 
(0.197) 
-0.858*** 




LNNUMBH  0.194*** 
(0.066) 
0.193*** 




LNFMAGE  -0.005 
(0.038) 
0.001 




LNCEOAGE  0.597*** 
(0.191) 
0.621*** 




DSOX  0.216** 
(0.110) 
0.129** 













INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
           
Sample Size  15,718  15,718    15,718  15,718 
R
2  0.135  0.133    0.294  0.276 
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Table 11. Estimation of the Structural System: the PIN Equation 
This table reports the maximum likelihood estimates on the PIN equation in the structural system. The 
dependent variable of interest is PIN, and the endogenous variable on the right hand-side of this 
equation  is  FORCETURN.  The  FORCETURN  relation  follows  a  reduced-form  probit  model 
specification:  
     Prob(FORCETURN) = λ0+ λ1*LNME+ λ2*ROA+λ3*RET1YR+ λ4*INDRET+ λ5*BETA 
     + λ6*VOL1YR+ λ7*LNSHTURN+ λ8*TOBIN+ λ 9*LNNUMEST+ λ10*INSTOHOLD 
     + λ11*LNNUMBH + λ12*LNFMAGE+ λ13*LNCEOAGE+ λ14*DSOX + INDUSTRY/YEAR, 
where DSOX is a dummy variable that equals one for years 2003-2005 and zero otherwise. Estimation 
results on the FORCETURN relation are suppressed for brevity. The sample period is 1995-2005. 
Firms are classified into one of the Fama-French 49 industries. Estimates on the industry dummies and 
year dummies are not reported. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in firms are reported in 
parentheses.    *,  **,  and  ***  denote  (two-sided)  significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels, 
respectively. 
  Model (1)  Model (2) 


























































INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes 
     
Sample Size  15,718  15,718 
Loglikelihood  20,409.63  20,234.00 
 
 